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COMMENTS
EXTRADITION ENIGMA: ITALY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS VS. AMERICA AND THE
DEATH PENALTY
Mark E. DeWitt'
Over the past several decades, the rendition of fugitives from the juris-
diction of one sovereign state to another has become increasingly com-
plex.1 Customary international law2 does not require the surrender of fu-
gitives by a foreign state to the jurisdiction of another state.3 This
+ J.D. candidate, May 1998, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 33 (International Studies
in Human Rights Vol. 17, 1991). This complexity is the result of increased procedural and
substantive protections given to the fugitive by human rights treaties. See generally id. at
33, 79-90 (describing several examples of such protections). The complexity is com-
pounded for the United States by the fact that extradition may not occur to or from the
United States without a treaty. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1994); see also Ethan A.
Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the International Rendition of
Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813, 814-15, 822-23 (1993) (describing the
nature and history of U.S. extradition practice). The United States is reluctant to join
multilateral extradition conventions due to the complexity of the U.S. judicial system, par-
ticularly its common law tradition, jurisdictional relationships, and complicated rules of
evidence. See id. at 827.
2. Broadly defined, customary international law is a "[b]ody of consensual principles
which have evolved from customs and practices civilized nations utilize in regulating their
relationships ... hav[ing] great moral force." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 816 (6th ed.
1990).
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 475 cmt. a (1987) ("Ex-
tradition is not required by customary law, and many states do not extradite except as
bound to do so by treaty."); cf M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 6-13 (1974) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER] (describing the historical and modern approach to the duty to extradite); M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 5-7 (3d. ed. 1996) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, LAW AND PRACTICE] (same).
Many states, including the United States, require a treaty in order for extradition to occur.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra, § 475 cmt. a (1987). More formally defined, extradition is "[t]he surrender by one
state or country to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its
own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to
try and punish him, demands the surrender." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2,
at 585. In Latin, extradition translates to extradere, which means "forceful return of a per-
son to his sovereign." BASSIOUNI, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra, at 2.
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process, commonly known as extradition, usually occurs only when the
two nations are bound by either a bilateral or multilateral treaty.4 With
the ascension of international human rights agreements,5 however, extra-
dition no longer occurs solely in the context of such treaties.6 Since the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights7 by the United
Nations in 1948, human rights agreements have become both more
prevalent and more assertive in international relations, wrestling their
way into the once sacred arena of sovereign treaty power and usurping
control from traditional extradition law.8
4. See BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 3, at 13, 19 (describing bi-
lateral and multilateral extradition schemes). Simply stated, a bilateral treaty is a treaty
between two nations, whereas a multilateral treaty is a treaty with more than two nations
as signing parties. See WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 112, 764 (10th ed. 1993)
(defining bilateral and multilateral).
5. For purposes of this Comment, "human rights agreement" refers to any conven-
tion, treaty, general agreement, or other multilateral international instrument designed to
promote individual rights.
6. See John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on
Extradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401, 415-16 (1990) (commenting on the
integration between extradition law and human rights law); see also GILBERT, supra note
1, at 79-80 (noting extradition protections available for individuals from sources other than
extradition law). Gilbert discusses, at length, the interaction between multilateral treaties
and extradition, pointing to the failures and relative successes. See id. at 20-25. Gilbert
notes that most of the successes have been the result of regional agreements, such as the
European Extradition Convention of 1957 and the Inter-American Convention on Extra-
dition. See id.; see also Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, OAS
T.S. No. 60 (OEA!Ser.A/36), 20 I.L.M. 723 (1981); European Convention on Extradition,
Dec. 12, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 273, E.T.S. 24. Gilbert also discusses how human rights
agreements have caused the nature of multilateral extradition agreements to change dra-
matically. See GILBERT, supra note 1, at 79-90. Gilbert focuses primarily upon the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and
the protections it affords persons subject to extradition. See id.; see also European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A(III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
One of the first major agreements to address international human rights, the Universal
Declaration represented mainly the aspirations of its drafters rather than the obligations
of its signatories, since the document was not legally binding upon U.N. members. Cf.
William A. Schabas, International Law and the Death Penalty, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 250, 251
(1994) (explaining that the Universal Declaration was a "catalogue" of human rights rec-
ognized by the constitutions of many different states). The Universal Declaration did,
however, serve as the initial step toward the drafting of a binding 1966 United Nations
human rights agreement, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See id.;
see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
8. See Quigley, supra note 6, at 429-30 (commenting that the development of human
rights has lead to greater protections for fugitives, and has affected the process by which
nations negotiate extradition treaties). See also generally GILBERT, supra note 1, at 79-90
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Before the advent of human rights agreements, nations often afforded
fugitives judicial proceedings prior to extradition, but these proceedings
typically did not involve complex scrutiny of the likely consequences of
surrender.9 Known as the rule of non-inquiry, this practice prevented ju-
dicial officers from examining the judicial and penal conditions of the
state requesting extradition.0 Four reasons are given for this practice.
First, inquiring into the legal systems of foreign states infringed upon
foreign affairs, an arena traditionally belonging to heads of state." Sec-
ond, the judiciary could not adequately investigate judicial and penal
conditions inside foreign states. 2 Third, courts expressed reluctance at
(discussing the complex interaction between human rights agreements and extradition law
with particular attention to the European Convention, and noting how human rights have
put substantive limitations upon states' ability to extradite fugitives).
9. See BASSIOUNI, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 486, 492 (explaining how
U.S. courts have often "refused to inquire into the processes by which a requested state
secures evidence of probable cause to request extradition, the means by which a criminal
conviction is obtained in a foreign state, or the penal treatment to which a relator may be
subjected upon extradition" and how government officials often argue against expansive
judicial involvement); cf. Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 882 (concluding that Congress and
the courts have afforded the executive branch deference in matters of extradition policy
and process); Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradi-
tion Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 87 (1992) (noting that because extradi-
tion was considered a subject of foreign diplomacy, courts did not involve themselves for-
mally in the process until the mid-1800s). Traditionally, the judicial role in extradition
served little purpose other than to ensure that all papers were in order. See id. at 89.
Judges in the requested state reviewed the applicable treaty for validity, confirmed the
fugitive's identity, ensured that dual criminality existed (meaning that the crime charged
was punishable in both states), and considered whether probable cause existed to believe
the fugitive had committed the offense. See id. For a complete discussion of a more mod-
ern extradition procedure, see generally GILBERT, supra note 1, at 33-68.
10. See Quigley, supra note 6, at 403; Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Con-
stitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1198, 1198 (1991); Kathleen F. Elliot, Comment, 18 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 347, 351 (1995); David B. Sullivan, Note, Abandoning the Rule of
Non-Inquiry in International Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 116
(1991). During the 1700s, extradition typically occurred without any judicial involvement.
See Quigley I, supra note 6, at 430. Before the middle part of the nineteenth century,
courts played a minimal role in extradition proceedings, because extradition decisions
were believed to be matters of foreign policy best left to heads of state. See Shea, su-
pra note 9, at 87.
11. See Semmelman, supra note 10, at 1229; Shea, supra note 9, at 93. The primary
concern was that a refusal to extradite would harm foreign relations with the requesting
state, possibly leading to retaliatory measures. See Semmelman, supra note 10, at 1230-31.
Therefore, it was argued that diplomats, such as the U.S. Secretary of State, were in the
best position to protect a fugitive's rights and balance foreign relations concerns. See id. at
1230; see also Sullivan, supra note 10, at 121-23 (discussing the Secretary of State's political
flexibility in extradition matters).
12. See Shea, supra note 9, at 93. Lacking any investigative power or agency, a court
could not substantiate any claim by a fugitive or a government, making the controversy
1998]
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judging the legal system of a foreign state because it encroached upon
the idea of state sovereignty. 13 Fourth, judicial scrutiny of unfamiliar for-
eign legal systems based upon a dissimilar ideology sometimes prevented
the extradition of dangerous criminals. 14 Therefore, because of these rea-
sons, courts deferred to heads of state in extradition proceedings and of-
ten required that any complaints involving human rights issues be di-
rected to the executive branch rather than to the courts. 5 Heads of state,
it was argued, were better equipped to consider factors such as foreign
policy and the desire to honor treaty obligations. 6
In addition to the rule of non-inquiry, the vast majority of extradition
treaties were bilateral, binding only the state seeking extradition of the
fugitive to its jurisdiction (requesting state) and the state considering ex-
tradition from its jurisdiction (requested state). 7 Problems may often
surface in these treaties, since the only interested parties are the two na-
tions bound by the treaty.18 The complicated process of re-negotiating a
bilateral treaty can cause nations to ignore possible concerns until a crisis
extremely difficult to resolve. See id.
13. See Shea, supra note 9, at 93; see also Sullivan, supra note 10, at 119 (noting that
the reason for the rule of non-inquiry is that the courts should not "supervis[e] the integ-
rity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation").
14. See Shea, supra note 9, at 93. Proponents of the rule of non-inquiry commonly
argue that the rule facilitates the extradition of dangerous criminals, such as international
terrorists and members of organized crime. See id. at 93 n.39; see also Kent Wellington,
Note, Extradition: A Fair and Effective Weapon in the War on Terrorism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
1447, 1450 (1990); cf. infra notes 242-54 and accompanying text (discussing the possible
harms of the inability to extradite fugitives between the United States and Italy).
15. See Shea, supra note 9, at 95. For example, United States courts often regard a
decision by the Secretary of State to surrender a fugitive as evidence that the individual
will receive fair treatment once extradited. See id. at 96; see also Sullivan, supra note 10, at
121 (noting that the Secretary of State is better able to ensure procedural fairness than a
court). All extradition requests, after judicial review and approval, come before the Secre-
tary of State, who has complete discretion in either granting or denying the extradition
request. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir. 1980); see also
Semmelman, supra note 10, at 1203. In addition, U.S. courts interpret part of the Extradi-
tion Act as preventing judicial review of a Secretary of State's final extradition decision.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1994) (stating that it is the Secretary of State, and not the courts,
who orders extradition); Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1105 (holding that the Secretary's decision
is not subject to judicial review).
16. See Shea, supra note 9, at 95; see also supra note 11 (discussing why heads of state
can better balance individual rights and foreign policy concerns).
17. See BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 3, at 13-14; GILBERT, supra
note 1, at 20. Most nations preferred bilateral treaties because they could tailor the trea-
ties to meet the specific needs of each nation. See id. at 20. To this day, the majority of
extradition agreements remain bilateral, although multilateral arrangements have gained
popularity. See id.; see also BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 3, at 13-14,
19.
18. See BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 3, at 15.
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erupts.' 9 Conversely, where multilateral treaties existed, they served
mainly to establish uniform extradition procedures within a given region,
ultimately giving little more protection to individual rights than a bilat-
eral agreement.' ° Accordingly, most extradition requests, whether under
a bilateral or multilateral treaty, involved only the governments of two
nations-the requesting state and the requested state.2 Regardless of
the type of extradition treaty in place, the decision to extradite usually
received only cursory judicial review, under the rule of non-inquiry, by a
court in the requested state.22 The final extradition decision was left to
the requested nation's head of state.23 Therefore, extradition commonly
occurred without any significant judicial review, instead serving primarily
19. See id. This reluctance can lead to a neglect of important human rights issues by
the responsible diplomatic and political factions of the two nations party to a bilateral ar-
rangement, and force the judiciary of one nation to step in and take action. See infra Part
III (detailing the Venezia decision).
20. See GILBERT, supra note 1, at 20-25. In fact, the overall simplicity in some of the
multilateral agreements actually decreased procedural protections by setting the "mini-
mum standard of joint convictions." Id. at 21-22. For example, the European Extradition
Convention of 1957, one of the largest treaties in terms of completed extraditions, allowed
extradition between member states without proof of a prima facie case against the fugitive.
See id. The treaty actually reduced the protections provided in the Federal Republic of
Germany, and forced Germany to conclude supplementary agreements in order to regain
the lost protections. See id. at 22. In addition, the treaty allowed nations to enter reserva-
tions, that, in the opinion of the government of Belgium, would lead to a greater number
of disputes than under the bilateral system. See id. A multilateral arrangement often must
appeal to the lowest common denominator among its members in order to gain support,
which leads to the ultimate failing of many multi-party extradition arrangements to protect
human rights adequately. See id.
21. See id. at 35-36 (giving a brief overview of extradition procedure and the types of
notice that are necessary to initiate an extradition request). For a bilateral treaty, this
statement is self-evident, since the treaty involves only two parties. For a multilateral
treaty, the common idea was to simplify extradition between nations in a given region
rather than to add any protections for those subject to extradition. See BASSIOUNI, LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 11 (commenting that states often enter into multilateral
treaties to "reduce[e] or eliminat[e] the divergence and uncertainty characteristic of mul-
tiple bilateral treaties and diverse national legislation ... [and attempts to] harmonize na-
tional systems, if not unify them with respect to the practice"); see also GILBERT, supra
note 1, at 20 (stating that multilateral extradition treaties, such as the European Extradi-
tion Convention of 1957, must work to satisfy all parties, and therefore represent a "com-
promise at the lowest level").
22. See Shea, supra note 9, at 87-89 (discussing the limited judicial role in traditional
extradition practice); see also Semmelman, supra note 10, at 1201-03 (explaining the typi-
cal request to the U.S. Government for extradition of a fugitive to a foreign nation). In
some jurisdictions, such as the United States, this process does not involve a full trial. See
id. at 1202.
23. See supra notes 11 and 15 (discussing the role of the head of state in extradition
decisions).
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
as a tool of foreign policy used at the discretion of national govern-
ments.24
Traditional extradition law changed with the advent of human rights
agreements, which imposed affirmative obligations upon member na-
tions.' 5 Under these agreements, closer scrutiny of the requesting na-
tion's internal affairs is required in order to give substance to an individ-
• 26
ual's rights. As a result, many human rights agreements created quasi-
judicial bodies to provide nations with uniform guidance in implementing
agreements and also to provide individuals with an avenue of judicial re-
view operating outside of the restraints of national courts.27 The latter
24. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 120-21 (noting that supporters of the rule often jus-
tify it as preventing the erosion of the executive's foreign affairs power and the ability to
provide "flexibility in conditioning extradition"); Shea, supra note 9, at 88 (arguing that
traditional extradition decisions were primarily governmental prerogatives because many
nations circumvented judicial involvement in extradition decisions); Sullivan, supra note
10, at 121 (noting that U.S. courts are hesitant to adjudicate matters that involve U.S.
treaty obligations).
25. See Quigley, supra note 6, at 415-16. Starting in the mid-twentieth century, hu-
man rights agreements took the form of binding obligations, independent of any concur-
rent treaty obligations. See id. Therefore, extradition protections for the fugitive in-
creased as human rights law developed. See id. at 430.
26. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 34 (1989) (adjudi-
cating an extradition request in light of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); see also infra Part II.A (discussing Soering).
The European Court on Human Rights stated in Soering, "the object and purpose of the
(European] Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings
require that its provisions be interpieted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical
and effective." Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34. The court's statement supports
the view that agreements such as the European Convention require that member states
inquire into the judicial and penal systems of the requesting state in order to avoid "any
foreseeable consequences of extradition suffered outside [the requested state's] jurisdic-
tion" that would violate individual human rights. Id.
27. See ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 28, at 179 (creating the United Nations Human
Rights Committee (UNHRC)); European Convention, supra note 6, art. 19, at 234 (cre-
ating both the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights). Because these judicial bodies were created by a human rights agreement,
they represent a tool for implementation of the obligations created by the agreements. Cf
WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 91-92, 219 (2d. ed. 1997) (stating that the UNHRC "considers the obligations of
States parties [under the ICCPR] in the context of [its] two implementation mechanisms"
and referring to the European Court as a "highly developed implementation mechanism"
intended to "interpret and apply" the European Convention). For example, the UNHRC
hears matters "only after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been
invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized princi-
ples of international law." Id. art. 41(1)(c), at 182. As such, members to the UNHRC
function as "independent experts" outside the control of any single organization, including
the United Nations itself. See DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 44-45 (1994). The most significant impact of the ICCPR
[Vol. 47:535
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function represented perhaps the most important feature of these
agreements, because, for the first time, individuals were given the power
to allege human rights violations and have these challenges against the
actions of a sovereign state recognized before an international judicial
body.28 Freed from the jurisdictional restraints of national courts, the ju-
dicial bodies created by human rights agreements directly incorporated
21many of the advances in human rights agreements into extradition law.
A profound effect of this integration was the balancing of the "right to
life"3" in the context of capital punishment against the desires to maintain
international cooperation in criminal matters.31 With several ground-
and UNHRC in international law has been the establishment of "a sophisticated range of
organs and procedures with jurisdiction to implement the human rights provisions [of
various agreements]." Id. at 22; see also Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 370 (Philip Al-
ston ed., 1992) ("[T]he purpose of the [ICCPR] is to promote ... human rights, and the
[UNHRC's] role in this respect is a central one in so far as one accepts the assumption that
effective national implementation requires a degree of international accountability.").
28. See European Convention, supra note 6, art. 25(1), at 236-38 (stating that under
the European Convention, individuals are allowed to file petitions alleging violations of
the Convention, provided that the state against which the violation is brought has recog-
nized the competence of the European Commission to hear such petitions). The power of
the European Commission and the European Court to protect the rights set out in the
European Convention rests upon a sovereign state's decision to subject itself to the Euro-
pean bodies' jurisdiction. See id. Such a limitation is now effectively moot, since all mem-
ber states have recognized the jurisdiction of the European Commission and European
Court. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Human Rights and Judicial Review: The European Court of
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE
RESPECTIVE 297, 300 (David M. Beatty ed., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS]. Al-
though a member state could renounce its agreement to allow the Court to hear individual
petitions involving the state, such a scenario is extremely unlikely because no European
nation would risk the criticism and possible breakdown of its European relations that
would follow. See id. at 303. For a discussion of the European Court, see infra note 57
(outlining the jurisdiction and powers of the Court).
29. See Craig R. Roecks, Comment, Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Pen-
alty: When Nations Must Refuse to Extradite a Person Charged With a Capital Crime, 25
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 189, 192-93 (1994) (stating that the initial synthesis of extradition law
and human rights treaties sprung from the decisions of treaty-based organizations); cf
Shea, supra note 9, at 98-103 (discussing the innovations of the European Court in ex-
panding the scope of human rights in Europe).
30. The "right to life" was recognized in the Universal Declaration as one of the
premier rights of the individual. See Universal Declaration, supra note 7, at art. 3, at 136
("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person."). Some argue that the
right to life is a basic inalienable right. See Sonia Rosen & Stephen Journey, Abolition of
the Death Penalty: An Emerging Norm of International Law, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL'Y 163, 171 (1993) (stating that "[i]f the goals of most human rights documents are...
to protect human beings ... certainly a State that imposes the death penalty is breaching
every value human rights instruments claim to hold dear").
31. Cf. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (noting that "the Convention is a
search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community
and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights"). Mutual
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breaking decisions,32 international human rights agreements, through
their treaty-spawned judicial bodies, have intruded into the realm of ex-
tradition law by incorporating human rights standards into extradition
proceedings involving the death penalty.33 The resulting amalgam of
human rights and extradition practice has subordinated extradition law
to human rights norms, and forced many states to restrict the conditions
under which they would surrender fugitives subject to capital punish-
ment.34 Therefore, as a staunch proponent of the death penalty, the
United States has begun to experience difficulty when seeking extradi-
tion of fugitives for capital crimes."
In addition to international judicial pressure opposing the death pen-
alty, in 1996, the United States' death penalty practice came under fire in
a European national court.37 The Italian Constitutional Court, over-
assistance in criminal matters is a primary goal for any extradition treaty. See GILBERT,
supra note 1, at 3 (stating that "[e]xtradition is one element in [a legislative and judicial
system] designed to stop fugitives using borders as a means of escaping justice").
32. See Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 189; Kindler v. Canada,
Communication No. 470/1991, views adopted on July 30, 1993, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307
(1993); Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 4; see also infra Part II (analyzing Soering,
Kindler, and Ng, and describing how they broke new ground in the merging of extradition
law and human rights).
33. See Roecks, supra note 29, at 231 (noting the "recent incorporation of the 'law of
extradition' into human rights law"); see also infra Part II (analyzing decisions of the
European Court and the UNHRC and how they invaded traditional notions of sovereignty
in extradition proceedings).
34. See Rosen & Journey, supra note 30, at 167 (referencing several cases in Ger-
many, Italy, and the Netherlands which support the belief that the European Convention
provision calling for the abolition of the death penalty "trumps any extradition treaty
whereby a person could receive the death penalty, even if that person is a citizen of a State
that has neither signed nor ratified [the provision]").
35. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY As CRUEL TREATMENT AND
TORTURE 79 (1996) (noting that public opinion in the United States favors the use of capi-
tal punishment). For a discussion of capital punishment in the United States, as compared
to international standards, see generally David Heffernan, Comment, America the Cruel
and Unusual? An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment Under International Law, 45 CATH.
U. L. REV. 481 (1996).
36. See discussion infra Part II (noting the decisions of international bodies that have
restricted extradition to the United States); see also discussion infra Part IV.C (arguing
that the decisions of the European Court and the UNHRC provided the foundation for
the Italian Constitutional Court's decision to refuse an extradition request by the United
States in In re Venezia).
37. See In re Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, translated in Appendix, infra. The origi-
nal version of this case was published in Italian. See In Re Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223,
Giur. Cost. 1996, 1918. The translated version of the case appearing in the Appendix was
furnished by the U.S. Department of Justice and is reprinted with its permission. All sub-
sequent citations to this case appearing in this Comment will refer to the translated ver-
sion in the Appendix.
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turning the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and Prime Minister,
refused to allow extradition of a death penalty fugitive to the United
States, asserting that the fugitive's right to life, as protected under the
Italian Constitution, trumped the bilateral extradition treaty between the
two nations.38 For the Italian court, human rights superceded any inter-
national obligations owed under an extradition treaty. 9 The actions of
the Italian Court clearly herald the possible emergence of a new trend
whereby the United States may find itself in direct conflict with foreign
national courts when trying to obtain extradition for capital crimes.4°
This Comment first discusses three major international decisions in-
volving the attempted extradition of fugitives subject to capital punish-
ment in the United States. This Comment then examines how these
cases have affected the landscape of death penalty extradition law, par-
ticularly when the United States is the requesting state. This Comment
next analyzes the Italian court's decision refusing an extradition to the
United States and the likely consequences of this decision. This Com-
ment concludes that the Italian court's decision initiates a trend whereby
national courts will become more active in enforcing human rights
agreements, which will pressure the United States to choose between re-
stricting its use of capital punishment or losing its ability to reclaim death
penalty fugitives through extradition proceedings.
I. BRAVE NEW WORLD-RISING GLOBAL REJECTION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE ASSURANCES PRINCIPLE
While many nations either have abolished or limited the use of the
death penalty,41 the use of capital punishment in the United States has
38. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 2.2.
39. See id. (stating that extradition to face proceedings for a crime punishable by
death is improper because it would interfere with the basic protection of life provided by
the Italian Constitution).
40. See Andrea Bianchi, International Decision, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 727, 733 (1997)
(stating that the decision "attests to the increasing difficulty in obtaining extradition from
European countries of fugitives charged with crimes punishable by death in the United
States and elsewhere" and signals the "emergence of a European ordre public" against
extradition to states with capital punishment); see also infra Part V (describing the implica-
tions of the Italian Constitutional Court decision, and the difficulties it creates for the
American judicial system).
41. Since 1976, on average, over two countries per year have abolished the death
penalty. See The Death Penalty: Facts & Figures (last modified Aug. 1997) <http://www.
amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/dpfacts.html>. Since 1985, more than 25 countries have abol-
ished the death penalty, while only four have reintroduced it. See id. Of these four, one
again abolished the death penalty, and the other three have yet to perform an execution.
See id. According to Amnesty International, as of July 10, 1997, 99 countries had abol-
ished the death penalty either de jure (having passed laws proscribing its use) or de facto
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increased42 since the Supreme Court reinstated its constitutionality in
1976.4' This state of affairs has created tension between the United
States and abolitionist nations.4' To resolve this conflict, the United
States engaged in the use of flexible bilateral extradition treaties. 45 Typi-
(retaining the punishment in written law but not imposing it), leaving 95 countries which
continued its use. See The Death Penalty-List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries
(last modified Aug. 1997) <http>//www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/dp/abrelist/htm.
The number of countries that actually use capital punishment is even smaller. See The
Death Penalty: Facts & Figures, supra.. In 1996, 4272 executions were performed by only
39 countries. See id. The People's Republic of China is the largest single executor of con-
victed offenders, with over 3500 executions in 1996, accounting for over 80% of the
world's executions. See id. The United States, with 366 executions, represents slightly un-
der 1% of the world's total executions. See id. During 1996, the United States ranked
seventh in the world in with 45 executions. See The Death Penalty: An International Per-
spective (visited Apr. 5, 1998) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpicintl.html>.
42. From 1976 to March 31, 1998, 451 executions have occurred in the United States,
with nearly half of the executions occurring in the last five years. See USA Executions (as
of 3/31/98) (visited Apr. 5, 1998) <http://www.smu.edu/-deathpen/summary.html>.
Thirty-eight states currently allow for capital punishment, and as of January 1, 1998, 3365
prisoners are on death row. See Death Penalty Information Center: States with the death
penalty (visited Apr. 5, 1998) <http://essential.org/dpic/dpicl.html>; Death Penalty Infor-
mation Center: Death Row Inmates by State (visited Apr. 5, 1998)
<http://essential.org/dpic/dpic5. html>. Four states account for nearly 45% of that total-
California (477), Texas (428), Florida (389), and Pennsylvania (213). See id.
43. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). After 1967, the death penalty as a
means of punishment had fallen into disuse, and was not used again until 1977 after the
Supreme Court's decision in Gregg. See Capital Punishment: A Rising Tide, (visited Apr.
5, 1998) <http://www.courttv.com/library/capital/intro.html>; see also Heffernan, supra
note 35, at 502-06 (discussing Gregg).
44. Cf SCHABAS, supra note 27, at 307-08 (stating that public opinion has caused
both national and international conflicts over the death penalty, and noting a world-wide
abolitionist trend that has lead to several refusals of extradition); Italian Court Bars Extra-
dition Over Death Penalty, ARIz. REPUBLIC, June 28, 1996, at A10 [hereinafter Italian
Court Bars Extradition] (noting that the tension between the United States and abolition-
ist nations has risen to a level whereby nations are beginning to ignore treaties with the
United States in favor of honoring their human rights obligations); see also infra Part III
(discussing the Venezia decision). As terms of art, countries that have abolished the death
penalty are referred to as "abolitionist nations" while those that retain it are referred to as
"retentionist nations."
45. Cf. GILBERT, supra note 1, at 20 (noting that the majority of extradition treaties
are bilateral, and therefore allow the two states to concoct a "piecemeal" solution to dif-
ferences). The treaties executed by the United States with abolitionist nations are flexible
in the sense that they set forth language which, by its use, does not establish a rigid frame-
work for death penalty extradition. Cf CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: GLOBAL ISSUES AND
PROSPECTS 29 (Peter Hodgkinson & Andrew Rutherford eds., 1996) [hereinafter
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT] (noting that many abolitionist nations, when concluding treaties
with retentionist nations, demand treaty provisions which will allow them to refuse extra-
dition if the fugitive will be subject to capital punishment). Most of these treaties are
based upon three principle model extradition treaties: the European Convention on Ex-
tradition, the Inter-American Convention on Extradition, and the United Nations Model
Treaty on Extradition. See id. at 43 n.113. For example, the provision in the U.S.-U.K.
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cal U.S. extradition treaty language provides that a requested state may
ask for "assurances," or "guarantees" as they are sometimes called, satis-
factory to the requested state that the requesting state will not impose
capital punishment in a particular case.46 If adequate assurances are not
provided, the requested state has the right to refuse extradition. The
typical treaty, however, provides no express definition of adequate as-
surances.48 More importantly, most nations leave the decision of ade-
Extradition Treaty dealing with capital punishment, typical of U.S. extradition treaties,
states that:
If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under
the relevant law of the requesting Party, but the relevant law of the requested
Party does not provide for the death penalty in a similar case, extradition may be
refused unless the requesting Party gives assurances satisfactory to the requested
Party that the death penalty will not be carried out.
Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. IV, 28 U.S.T. 227, 230 [hereinafter U.S.-
U.K. Extradition Treaty]. The phrase "assurances satisfactory to the requested Party" is
the primary source of the flexibility, especially since the decision of what is and is not
"satisfactory" ultimately is made by a head of state in the requested state and is not sub-
ject to judicial review. See generally Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 16-20 (1989) (outlining the U.S.-U.K. extradition procedure and noting that, under
the treaty and domestic law, a U.K. court may not review the U.K. Secretary of State's de-
cision to extradite on grounds that he failed to consider a possible breach of the European
Convention). Thus, the ultimate decision is left in the hands of diplomats, who may use
this flexibility to accommodate foreign relations. Cf. Semmelman, supra note 10, at 1199
(recognizing the argument that leaving the extradition decision solely in the hands of the
executive branch may cause an undue concern for "political expediency" at the expense of
human rights).
46. See U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 45, art. IV, at 230; see also Extradi-
tion Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, art. IX, 35 U.S.T. 3023, 3031 [hereinafter U.S.-Italy
Extradition Treaty] (providing that "extradition shall be refused unless the requesting
Party provides such assurances as the requested Party considers sufficient"); Extradition
Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Canada, art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983, 989 [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Ex-
tradition Treaty] (stating that "extradition may be refused unless the requesting State pro-
vides such assurances as the requested State considers sufficient").
47. See U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 46, art. IX, at 3031 (stating that as-
surances must be given or extradition may be refused); U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty,
supra note 46, at 989 (allowing the refusal of extradition if assurances from the requesting
state are not received).
48. See U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 45, art. IV, at 230 (stating only that
assurances must be "satisfactory to the requested Party that the death penalty will not be
carried out"). Taken contextually, the treaty alone provides no boundaries for what con-
stitutes "satisfactory" assurances. See id. Indeed, past cases reflect a disparity in ap-
proaches to the issue. For example, the United Kingdom, until the decision in Soering,
considered a promise to make proper "representations" to the sentencing judge satisfac-
tory assurance under the U.S.-U.K Extradition Treaty. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 19. The proper "representations" consisted of statements to the sentencing
judge that the United Kingdom desired that capital punishment not be imposed. See id.
Canada, under the U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty, determined that no assurances need
be given except for "exceptional" cases. See Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991,
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at
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quacy within the discretion of government officials rather than the
courts.49
The inherent and purposeful flexibility of the "assurances" principle
ultimately proved to be a double-edged sword. While the principle eased
tensions over the death penalty between national governments, the in-
creased protections given by international human rights agreements
clashed with the discretion extradition treaties gave government officials
in most death penalty extraditions.50
II. BALANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE "RIGHT TO LIFE" WITH THE
SOVEREIGN NATION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The advent of human rights agreements resulted in several significant
limitations on extradition.5' In the context of capital punishment, various
189, 190; Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, views adopted on July 30,
1993, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. 307, 308, 314 (1993).
49. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14-15, 17-19 (stating that the decision to
extradite based upon assurances rested with the United Kingdom's Secretary of State);
Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 308 (noting that the decision to seek assurances under the
U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty is made by the Canadian Minister of Justice). In Soering,
although the United Kingdom Divisional Court expressed some displeasure with the suffi-
ciency of the assurances given by the United States, it was restricted to reviewing the U.K.
Secretary of State's decision for "illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety." 161
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18, 37-38. Thus, the court adjudicated the matter not independ-
ently, but through the eyes of the Secretary of State. See id. at 18 (stating that the "test in
an extradition case would be that no reasonable Secretary of State could have made an
order for return in the circumstances"). Although stricter scrutiny is given when the fugi-
tive's life is at stake, the U.K. courts, prior to Soering, would not review any Secretary of
State decision solely because the Secretary failed to consider possible breaches of the
European Convention. See id. at 18-19. Taken in sum, the actions of U.K. courts, prior to
Soering, show a strong affinity for the rule of non-inquiry. See supra notes 9-16 and ac-
companying text (discussing the rule of non-inquiry); see also infra Part II.A (discussing
Soering).
50. See Quigley, supra note 6, at 438-39 (stating that the rule of non-inquiry and ex-
tradition law are "inconsistent with human rights law"); Shea, supra note 9, at 111 (noting
that Soering represented the incompatibility of modern human rights and traditional ex-
tradition law); id. at 125-37 (discussing the discretionary nature of the extradition process
and the expanding judicial role in providing parameters for such discretion); see also supra
notes 9-16 and accompanying text (describing the rule of non-inquiry and its rationale).
The flexibility of giving assurances could not be reconciled with the desire to provide uni-
form protection for individuals subject to extradition. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 36-38 (noting the inadequacy of assurances in protecting extradited individuals). In
Soering, although the U.K. Secretary of State initially approved Soering's extradition, the
European Court of Human Rights decided that the assurances given by the U.S. prose-
cuting attorney were not enough to preclude a violation of Soering's rights under the
European Convention. See id.
51. See GILBERT, supra note 1, at 79-90 (discussing human rights provisions and their
applicability to and limitation on extradition); Quigley, supra note 6, at 430 (noting that as
human rights laws have developed, individuals subject to extradition have obtained in-
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agreements stress the "right to life" in varying degrees of importance.
Nations that are party to such agreements must look to both national law
and human rights agreements to provide appropriate standards when de-
ciding to extradite fugitives in death penalty cases. 3 Also, as mentioned,
creased protections). Human rights recognized in various human rights agreements have
helped impose several substantive limitations upon extradition. See GILBERT, supra note
1, at 83-89 (discussing limitations imposed by human rights agreements); see also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Pro-
cedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 235, 253-291 (1993) (comparing the rights found in various human rights
agreements with those present in national constitutions). Broadly classified, these rights
include the right to life and physical integrity (encompassing both the right to life and
other corollary rights such as freedom from torture and freedom from inhuman punish-
ment), the right to a fair trial (including rights such as the right to be presumed innocent,
the right to assistance of counsel, and the right to a speedy trial) and the right to liberty
(comprised of rights such as the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention, the
right to be protected from double jeopardy, the right to be protected from ex post facto
laws, and the right to appeal). See id.; GILBERT, supra note 1, at 79-90.
52. For example, the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty makes no mention of any "right to
life." See U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 45. The European Convention, as
originally written, made the rather weak assertion that "[elveryone's right to life shall be
protected by law... [except] in the execution of a sentence of a court following ... convic-
tion of a crime for which [the death] penalty is provided by law." European Convention,
supra note 6, art. 2(1), at 224. This was later amended by Protocol No. 6 to the European
Convention, which asserted that "[t]he death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be
condemned to such penalty or executed [within member states]." Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, E.T.S. 114 [hereinafter Protocol No. 6]. The American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), while not expressly asserting a right to life, does
seek to limit any expansion of capital punishment by stating that "[tihe application of
[capital] punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently apply
... [and] shall not be reestablished in states that have abolished it." American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4(2) & (3), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 145. As of December
1992, the ACHR included 29 signatory nations. See KATHERINE C. HALL, INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A RESOURCE GUIDE 45 (1993). The United States
signed the accord in 1977, but the treaty was never ratified by the Senate. See id.
Perhaps the strongest assertion is made by the Inter-American Convention on Extradi-
tion, which requires that "States Parties shall not grant extradition when the offense in
question is punishable in the requesting State by the death penalty, by life imprisonment,
or by degrading punishment, unless.., sufficient assurances... [are obtained that] if such
penalties are imposed, they will not be enforced." Inter-American Convention on Extra-
dition, supra note 6, art. 9, at 724. The Inter-American Convention on Extradition was
signed by several Central and South American nations. See id. at 723.
53. Cf Michael O'Boyle, Extradition and Expulsion Under the European Convention
on Human Rights: Reflections on the Soering Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93, 96-98 (James O'Reilly ed., 1992) (noting that the European
Court in Soering found that while extradition may be permissible under national law, there
is no exception to the European Convention's requirement against inhuman punishment);
Richard B. Lillich, Harmonizing Human Rights Law Nationally and Internationally: The
Death Row Phenomenon as a Case Study, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 699, 711 (1996) (asserting
that national courts have begun to consider the interpretation of international human
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conflicts between national law and human rights obligations frequently
occur because individuals subject to extradition are empowered to chal-
lenge the sovereign actions of the requested state. 4 Thus, the absolute
concept of national sovereignty cannot co-exist peaceably with the inter-
national concept of human rights.5 Rather, a delicate balance must be
struck.56
rights law by international and regional courts as well as quasi-judicial bodies).
54. See European Convention, supra note 6, at 236 ("the [European Human Rights]
Commission may receive petitions ... from any person, non-governmental organisation or
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contract-
ing Parties .. "). The United Kingdom's adherence to this provision ultimately allowed
Soering to challenge the U.K. extradition decision before the European Court. See Soer-
ing v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 30-31 (1989). Had this provision not
been present, Soering, under the traditional rule of non-inquiry, would not have had the
opportunity for a substantive review of his claim. See id. at 15, 18 (noting that the U.K.
Divisional Court refused Soering's habeas corpus claim because it was premature and, in
addition, the U.K. court would not review an extradition decision on grounds that it
breached the European Convention); see also supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text
(discussing the rule of non-inquiry and traditional judicial review of extradition decisions).
55. See Bassiouni, supra note 51, at 241-42 (noting the tension between these two
concepts); cf John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45
CATH. U. L. REV. 1213, 1217 (1996) (stating that modern human rights law provides
courts the opportunity to abandon the rule of non-inquiry). Both Quigley and Bassiouni
believe that the development of human rights law has led to the abandonment of the rule
of non-inquiry. See id.; cf. Bassiouni, supra note 51, at 241-42 (stating that international
human rights law has lead to the "erosion of national sovereignty with respect to practices
within the context of the administration of criminal justice"). This abandonment erodes
sovereignty by forcing requested states to assess the conditions within the requesting state.
See O'Boyle, supra note 53, at 97 (stating that Soering requires a state to assess conditions
in the requesting state); Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Con-
stitutional and International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 321, 393-94 (noting that "the
meaning attributed to sovereignty in international law, like its constitutional counterpart,
has been subordinated to the protection of human rights"). Such a result gives the re-
quested state a degree of control that invades the "international independence of a state..
. [and its] right and power [to] regulat[e] its internal affairs without foreign dictation."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1396 (defining sovereignty); Judge Edward
D. Re, Human Rights, International Law, and Domestic Courts, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 1-2 (1996) (commenting that "the existence of human rights implies a limita-
tion upon the unfettered sovereignty of states, as well as a duty upon nations to respect
these rights."); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary In-
ternational Law, in HUMAN RIGHTs LAW 545, 548 (Philip Alston ed., 1996) (arguing that
"no serious scholar still supports the contention that internal human rights are [protected
by national sovereignty] and hence insulated from international law [concerning human
rights]").
56. This was precisely the problem faced by the European Court in Soering. See 161
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33-36. The European Court had legitimate concerns about lim-
iting the agreement only to violations that occur inside member states. See id. Such a de-
cision would allow member states to extradite to non-member states without regard for
the European Convention. See id. In addition, the court had to consider the effect of in-
terposing in U.S.-U.K. treaty obligations and possibly creating a 'safe-haven' in the United
Kingdom for fugitives wishing to avoid extradition to the United States. See id. The resul-
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A. The European Court of Human Rights: Soering v. United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights57 (European Court) took an
important step towards achieving this balance when it held that surren-
dering a death penalty fugitive to the United States without greater as-
surance against the imposition of capital punishment would violate the
European Convention.5 In 1985, Jens Soering, a German national, and
his girlfriend, Elizabeth Haysom, fled the United States after the murder
of Haysom's parents in Bedford County, Virginia. 9 They were arrested
for fraud the following year in the United Kingdom, and the United
States requested their extradition to stand trial for murder.60 Soering
objected to his extradition for capital murder, punishable by death, and
ultimately challenged the United Kingdom Secretary of State's decision
to extradite him before the European Court."1
tant balancing approach of the court ignored a narrow interpretation of the European
Convention, which would have preserved national sovereignty, in favor of an interpreta-
tion that limits sovereignty whenever it is necessary to protect the "object and purpose of
the Convention." Id. at 34; see also GILBERT, supra note 1, at 80 (stating that balancing
must be done with human rights conventions and requests for extradition); Bernhardt, su-
pra note 28, at 306 (noting that Soering imposed a restriction on national sovereignty).
57. The European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human
Rights (European Commission) exist as part of the European Convention. See European
Convention, supra note 6, art. 19, at 234. The European Commission receives all com-
plaints from individuals, and decides whether the complaint is admissible. See Bernhardt,
supra note 28, at 299. If the complaint is admitted, the Commission attempts to reach an
amicable settlement. See id. If the Commission cannot resolve the dispute, either the
Commission or the interested state may bring the matter before the European Court, pro-
vided jurisdiction is recognized by the interested state. See id. at 299-300;
see also supra note 28 (discussing the ability of individuals to file petitions under the
European Convention). The European Court has final decision for any matter. See Bern-
hardt, supra note 28, at 300; see also supra note 28 (discussing the ability of member states
to refuse jurisdiction). The European Court normally sits with nine members, although in
some cases a full plenary court of 25 to 40 judges may be called. See Bernhardt, supra note
28, at 301. For a more complete discussion of the European Court by the Vice-President
of the Court, see id. at 297-314.
58. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 50.
59. See id at 11. Soering, the son of a German diplomat, attended the University of
Virginia with Haysom. See Carlos Santos, Life Focused on Winning Freedom, Former
U. Va. Scholar Insists, "I Didn't Do It", RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 24, 1996, at
A8. Soering, who once stated that they referred to their crime as "our little nasty," con-
tests his guilt to this day. See id. Haysom was extradited without incident, pled guilty, and
was sentenced to 90 years imprisonment. See id. The Virginia parole board denied her
release in May 1995. See Carlos Santos, Parole Board Denies Haysom Early Release,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 24,1995, at B4.
60. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-12.
61. See id. at 30-31.
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62After a plenary review, the European Court handed down a decision
that forever altered the process of international extradition. In Soering,
the Court held that the United Kingdom's decision to extradite Soering
to the United States under a charge of capital murder would violate Arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention,6 which protects individuals against
"inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."65 The court believed
that Soering, if condemned to death row, would suffer treatment beyond
the threshold limit permitted by the European Convention.6' Soering's
62. Soering's case was heard with 18 judges present, and resulted in an unanimous
decision by the European Court. See id. at 8; Bernhardt, supra note 28, at 312-13.
63. See O'Boyle, supra note 53, at 94 (noting that Soering was a "landmark decision"
in extradition law as well as international jurisprudence); Lillich, supra note 53, at 703-04
(stating that the decision was an "exceptional and precedent-making one," even though
the Court refrained from holding that death row conditions alone violated the European
Convention).
64. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45.
65. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, at 224. Article 3 of the European
Convention also protects individuals against torture. See id. The European Court de-
clared that the time of confinement on death row, averaging from six to eight years, along
with the age and mental state of Soering at the time of the crime, amounted to a breach of
Article 3. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45.
66. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 44-45. Prior to Soering, the European
Commission had twice examined a similar problem. In Altun v. Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Commission decided that an extradition could result in a breach of Article 3 of
the European Convention. See App. No. 10308/83, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
209, 209 (1983). However, before the Commission rendered a final decision on the possi-
bility of a violation, Altun committed suicide. See Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany,
36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 256, 256 (1984). That same year, the Commission
heard Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, a case similar to Soering. See App. No. 10479/83, 37
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158 (1984). The Commission found that the length of
detention and death row conditions in California were not sufficiently grave to amount to
a breach of Article 3. See id. at 188, 190. Soering, while applying the same principles es-
tablished in Altun and Kirkwood, ended in a radically different result. See 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45 (holding that conditions on death row in the United States would
violate the European Convention). In Soering, the Commission referred the case to the
European Court upon a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, which mandates that
individuals "have an effective remedy before a national authority." European Convention,
supra note 6, at 232; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31. The Commission, in line
with Kirkwood, had found no violation of Article 3. See id. The European Court, in con-
trast, found no violation of Article 13, but did find a violation of Article 3. See id. at 44-45,
46-50. Thus, Soering adopted the underlying principles of Altun and Kirkwood, but the
European Court lowered the threshold for finding a violation of Article 3, and determined
that Soering's extradition would result in a violation of his rights under the European
Convention. See id. at 44-45. For these reasons, Soering is considered a significant depar-
ture from prior Article 3 case law. See Renee E. Boxman, Comment, The Road to Soering
and Beyond. Will the United States Recognize the "Death Row Phenomenon?", 14 HouS. J.
INT'L L. 151, 163-64 (1991).
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age at the time of the crime67 as well as his mental state,"' were significant
factors for the court, but it also recognized the "death row phenomenon"
as a major factor in its decision.,9 The European Court believed that the
conditions on death row, particularly the psychological and physical an-
guish of awaiting execution, when combined with the length of detention,
created a phenomenon that exceeded the European Convention's
threshold for inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.0
Soering marked a dramatic change in the landscape of extradition
law." Before Soering, many European states operated under traditional
extradition procedures" with little regard for the requirements of human
67. Soering was 18 when the murders were committed. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 11.
68. Soering supposedly suffered from "folie d deux," a mental abnormality where a
person becomes immersed in the identity of another, and is therefore highly susceptible to
that other person's suggestions. See id. at 14. Soering argued that Haysom, through folie d
deux syndrome, had persuaded him to murder her parents. See id. In the United King-
dom, folie d deux reduces the culpability of the offender's actions, and acts as a defense to
murder, lowering it to manslaughter. See id
69. The "death row phenomenon," as recognized by the Court, consists of two ele-
ments: (1) the length of imprisonment prior to execution, which the Court found to be on
average six to eight years; and (2) the conditions on death row, mainly the extreme psy-
chological stress and strict custodial regime employed by the prison. See id. at 42-43. The
Court held that the death row phenomenon violated Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion. See id. at 44-45.
Another important factor that contributed to the European Court's decision was the in-
volvement of the Federal Republic of Germany. See id. at 12-13. The West German gov-
ernment formally requested Soering's extradition to Germany to stand trial after Soering
was interviewed by a German prosecutor. See id. at 12. The U.K. government believed
that the evidence against Soering collected by the prosecutor would not amount to a
prima facie case in Germany, and therefore proceeded with the U.S. request. See id. at 12-
13. Addressing the issue, the European Court noted the Commission and United King-
dom's argument that extradition to Germany would create a double standard whereby fu-
gitives subject to requests from alternative jurisdictions without the death penalty would
be better protected than those who were not. See id. at 44. The Court stated that this ar-
gument presented a "circumstance of relevance" to its decision. Id.
70. See id. at 44-45.
71. See Stephan Breitenmoser & Gunter E. Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The
Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 845, 879-83 (1990) (stating that the Soering decision
represented a new age in international law where individuals would have greater rights
under extradition treaties); O'Boyle, supra note 53, at 93-94, 106-07 (noting that Soer-
ing was a highly important decision for human rights and will likely result in increased ex-
tradition challenges in national and international courts). Soering imposed a duty upon
requested states to consider the treatment a fugitive will receive in the requesting state.
See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-36. In addition, Soering was the first interna-
tional human rights case to recognize the death row phenomenon. See Lillich, supra note
53, at 703-04.
72. See supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text (noting that judicial review was usu-
ally limited to the sufficiency of the request, that is, whether all the proper formalities had
been observed, instead of any substantive review of the possibility of human rights viola-
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rights agreements.73 Many states felt that the obligation to consider such
agreements during extradition applied only to violations occurring within
the requested state, and that challenges to an extradition decision could
not be based on possible future harm occurring in a nation not party to
the agreement. 74 The Soering decision rejected this view by holding that
member states must prevent both real harm within their own jurisdiction,
as well as prevent "all and any foreseeable consequences of extradition
suffered outside their jurisdiction."" Consequently, when making extra-
dition decisions, member states may consider their own concerns, but
tions).
73. Cf. Shea, supra note 9, at 88-89. Prior to Soering, U.K. courts would not review
decisions of the U.K. Secretary of State based solely upon allegations that the Secretary
had failed to consider possible breaches of the European Convention. See Soering, 161
Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 18; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the
nature of review by U.K. courts in such situations).
74. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32-33 (discussing the United Kingdom's
arguments against the application of Article 3 of the European Convention to extradition
decisions); see also Regina C. Donnelly, Case Comment, Soering v. United Kingdom:
Whether the Continued Use of the Death Penalty in the United States Contradicts Interna-
tional Thinking?, 16 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 339, 348 (1990) (stat-
ing that the Soering decision was a departure from the European Court's usual discussion,
because it concentrated on the possibility of future, rather than past, violations of Article 3
in a non-member, rather than member, state).
If Soering had been subjected to torture in a U.K. prison, a clear violatien of Article 3
would exist, because the torture had occurred within a member state. See European Con-
vention, supra note 6, art. 3, at 224 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."). Alternatively, Soering addressed the possibility of
a violation in a non-member requesting state. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
34-36. This presented not only the problem of the applicability of Article 3 to non-
member states, but also the problem of considering harm not yet inflicted. See O'Boyle,
supra note 53, at 96-98. Thus, the Court would be applying the European Convention to
the possible future actions of non-member states based upon predictions of possible
treatment. See id. (discussing the European Court's approach to this dilemma). This con-
stituted a large part of the United Kingdom's argument in Soering, and was expressly re-
jected by the European Court. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33-34.
In addition, in arguing against the application of Article 3 to extradition proceedings in-
volving non-member states, the United Kingdom asserted in Soering that it would inter-
fere with rights and obligations under treaties, and force member states into evaluating the
judicial systems of non-member states. See id. at 33. In essence, the United Kingdom ar-
gued all the traditional justifications for the rule of non-inquiry. See supra notes 9-16 and
accompanying text (discussing the justifications for the rule of non-inquiry).
75. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33-34. Such a result culminates in the sub-
jection of national sovereignty to human rights. See O'Boyle, supra note 53, at 96-97. The
European Court not only adjudicated the actions of the member state (the United King-
dom), but it also examined the sovereign actions of a non-member state (the United
States) before they occurred and without absolute evidence that they would. See Soering,
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32-50 (analyzing the actions of the United States and United
Kingdom, and giving justifications for the decision to apply a forseeability standard to the
U.K.'s extradition decision); see also supra note 56 (discussing the European Court's bal-
ancing of national sovereignty and human rights).
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also must consider the requirements of the European Convention."
Thus, Soering created uniformity within Europe to the extent that it es-
tablished the level of scrutiny necessary for extradition to a state that im-
poses the death penalty. 7 Outside of Europe, the Soering decision has
been noted as providing persuasive reasoning for both national courts
and other international human rights bodies to reexamine their treat-
ment of extradition law.78
B. United Nations Human Rights Committee-Post-Soering Death
Penalty Extradition Cases Under the ICCPR
The United Nations Human Rights Committee 79 (UNHRC) also has
dealt with the complex issues presented in Soering. ° In two separate
cases, the UNHRC reviewed the extradition of death penalty fugitives
from Canada to the United States.81 In these two cases, unlike the facts
76. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33-34; see also Breitenmoser & Wilms,
supra note 71, at 879, 881 (noting the European Court's implicit rejection of the concept
that extradition is a matter solely between states); Donnelly, supra note 74, at 347 (stating
that the Soering decision meant that the European Convention takes precedence over any
concurrent extradition treaty obligations with a non-member state).
77. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33-34. It is important to note that all
member states give great deference to the competency of the European Court. See Bern-
hardt, supra note 28, at 303. Member states have respected all decisions of the court with-
out exception, despite the lack of any unequivocal requirement to do so. See id. at 303-04.
Additionally, member states are unlikely to denounce any decision by the court, since
public opinion would likely oppose such action. See id. at 303. Thus, the "foreseeable
consequences" test within Soering is applicable to all member states. See Soering, 161 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (referring to the "foreseeable consequences" test as a responsibility
of all member states).
78. See O'Boyle, supra note 53, at 106-07 (noting that Soering will be a "fertile source
of doctrine" for courts outside the European Convention); Shea, supra note 9, at 111, 126
(stating that Soering encourages a revisitation of the justifications underlying current ex-
tradition practices).
79. The United Nations Human Rights Committee was established in 1977 under Ar-
ticle 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See ICCPR, supra
note 7, art. 28, at 179. Similar to the European Convention, the UNHRC may hear com-
plaints from individuals. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, preamble, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967). The UNHRC con-
sists of eighteen members elected by nations party to the ICCPR. See MCGOLDRICK, su-
pra note 27, at 44-46; see also supra note 27 (discussing the position of the UNHRC in in-
ternational human rights enforcement).
80. Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
49th Sess., Supp. No, 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 189 (deciding whether or not the
extradition of a death penalty fugitive to the United States was proper under the ICCPR);
Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, views adopted on July 30, 1993, 14
HUM. RTs. L.J. 307 (1993) (same).
81. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 189-90; Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 307.
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of the Soering case, the Canadian Minister of Justice had decided not to
seek any assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed.2
Thus, a critical issue for the UNHRC was not the level of assurances re-
quired, but rather if any assurances were necessary at all.83 While the
UNHRC found a human rights violation in only one of the cases, the rea-
soning in each decision was relatively uniform in its approach to the is-
sues involved in death penalty extradition.8
1. Setting the Stage for Change: Kindler v. Canada
In Kindler v. Canada, the UNHRC attempted to achieve a delicate
balance between state sovereignty and human rights. Although the
UNHRC found no violation of ICCPR, the Committee established a
framework it would use to address death penalty extradition." The case
involved Joseph Kindler, a convicted murderer and kidnapper who had
escaped from Pennsylvania authorities and fled to Canada. 6 After his
arrest in Canada in 1987, U.S. officials requested his extradition, and
Canada proceeded to extradite Kindler without seeking assurances that
the death penalty would not be imposed.7 Kindler appealed, and the
82. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 190; Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 308.
83. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 204-05; Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 309.
84. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing the similarities of Kin-
dler and Ng and the standards established by the two decisions).
85. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 314 (laying out the relevant considerations for
death penalty extradition).
86. See id. at 307-09. In 1982, Kindler was arrested for the death of a burglary suspect
who had agreed to give testimony exposing a burglary ring in which Kindler was involved.
.See Edward Colimore, Double Escapee Caught a 2d Time in Canada, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Sept. 7, 1988, at B4. Kindler beat the witness to death with a baseball bat and
pipe, tied a cinder block around his neck, and threw the body into the Delaware River.
See Toni Locy, TV Tip Leads to Capture of Phila. Killer in Canada, PHILADELPHIA
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 1988, at 4. A Pennsylvania jury convicted Kindler in 1983 for kid-
napping and murder, and recommended that he be put to death. See id.; see also Kindler,
14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 308. Shortly before his sentencing, Kindler escaped the Philadelphia
Detention Center by sawing through the bars on his cell window and climbing a barb-wire
fence. See Scott Flander, City Murderer Flees in Canada, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 27, 1986, at 3. He made his way to Canada and was arrested in 1985, only to escape
again in 1986 before Canada could extradite him to the United States. See id. Kindler and
another prisoner broke through a skylight and lowered themselves to the street below us-
ing a rope made of bedsheets. See id. Finally, in 1987, Kindler, at this point on the FBI's
Most Wanted list, was captured in Canada after several friends recognized him from a
taped segment of TV's "America's Most Wanted." See Colimore, supra, at B4. Kindler
had assumed an alias and was arrested at his job. See id.
87. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 308. The Minister of Justice for Canada has
discretion to seek assurances under the Canadian Extradition Act of 1985. See id. Section
25 of the Act gives the Minister of Justice power to order the surrender of a fugitive who
has been approved for extradition. See id.
[Vol. 47:535
Extradition Enigma
Supreme Court of Canada held that the decision to extradite Kindler
without assurances did not violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 8 Kindler challenged the Canadian Court's decision before
the UNHRC, arguing that his rights were violated under the ICCPR.89
Canada, however, extradited Kindler the day the Supreme Court of Can-
ada announced its opinion, ignoring the UNHRC's request to halt extra-
dition.90 Despite the Canadian government's actions, the UNHRC found
that no violation of the ICCPR had occurred. 9' Although the UNHRC
established that Canada had an obligation under the ICCPR to examine
any possible violations of Kindler's rights by the United States,9, the
Committee did not validate Kindler's claims that the death penalty itself
was "cruel and inhuman treatment" 93 or that conditions on death row in
88. See Kindler, 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. at 308; see also Kindler v. Canada (Minister of
Justice) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 780. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Cana-
dian Charter) is the Canadian equivalent of the U.S. Bill of Rights. See Frank lacobucci,
Judicial Review by the Supreme Court of Canada Under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms: The First Ten Years, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 93, 96. The Su-
preme Court of Canada may declare legislation invalid if it conflicts with the protections
contained within the Canadian Charter. See id. at 94. The protections include civil liber-
ties (such as freedom of religion), basic legal rights (such as the right to a fair trial), and
various democratic rights (such as the right to vote). See id. at 96.
89. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 307-08. Specifically, Kindler alleged that "the
death penalty per se constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, and that
conditions on death row are cruel, inhuman and degrading ... [and] the judicial proce-
dures in Pennsylvania, inasmuch as they relate specifically to capital punishment, do not
meet basic requirements of justice." Id. at 308. Kindler, a white male, also alleged racial
bias in the imposition of the death penalty, but did not provide any evidence supporting
his claim. See id.
90. See id. at 308, 314.
91. See id. at 314. The UNHRC expressed its "regret" that Canada did not comply
with the request to halt extradition. See id.; see also Keith Highet & George Kahale III,
International Decisions, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 128 (1993).
92. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 309 (establishing a "necessary and foreseeable
consequence" standard). Note the similarity between the UNHRC's approach and the
European Court's approach in Soering. See id.; see also supra note 75 and accompanying
text (discussing the "foreseeable consequence" standard enunciated by the European
Court in Soering). Both decisions require the requested state to apply a foreseeability
standard to extradition decisions that necessarily involves inquiries into the requesting
state. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 309; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35
(1989). Such a practice, at least for national courts, would be in direct conflict with the
rule of non-inquiry. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of
non-inquiry). Although they do not expressly state the intent, both the UNHRC and the
European Court apply their respective human rights agreements in a way that, if followed,
forces nations to abandon the rule of non-inquiry and traditional theories of extradition
and national sovereignty. See discussion infra Part II.C. (showing how the decisions of the
UNHRC and European Court have changed extradition law).
93. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 309. The UNHRC referred to Article 7 of the
ICCPR, which reads: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or de-
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Pennsylvania failed to meet the "basic requirements of justice."'94 The
UNHRC stated that the ICCPR does not prohibit the death penalty, and
furthermore, that Kindler had presented no evidence that the conditions
on Pennsylvania's death row violated the ICCPR.9 The UNHRC also
determined that the ICCPR does not require state parties to refuse ex-
tradition in death penalty cases or to seek assurances from the requesting
state.96
grading treatment or punishment." ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 7, at 175. The Committee
believed that Article 6, paragraph 2, which allows capital punishment in limited circum-
stances, must be read in conjunction with Article 7. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 314;
see also ICCPR, supra note 7, art 6., at 174-75. Therefore, it held that capital punishment
is not a per se violation of Article 7. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 314.
94. Kindler, 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. at 308, 314. The UNHRC believed that Kindler had
received an opportunity to challenge his conviction, both in the United States and Canada.
Cf id. at 314 (stating that Kindler was extradited "following extensive proceedings in the
Canadian Courts, which reviewed all the evidence submitted concerning Mr. Kindler's
trial and conviction [in the United States]"). The UNHRC carefully selected its language,
expressing a desire that in circumstances similar to these, assurances would have been a
proper measure. See id. Also, the Committee did not rule out the possibility that if par-
ticular facts were different, a violation could occur. See id. (noting the factors which, if
sufficient, "could constitute a violation" of the ICCPR).
95. See id. at 314. Kindler appeared to be relying on the argument successful in So-
ering, namely, the "death row phenomenon." See id. at 308. The UNHRC had addressed
the basic argument in an earlier case, and, unlike the European Court, had decided that
prolonged periods of incarceration, if caused by inmate appeals, did not violate Article 7
of the ICCPR. See id. at 309; see also Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication Nos.
210/1986,225/1987, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 222, U.N.
Doc. A/44/40 (1989). The UNHRC's prior decision in Pratt & Morgan, plus Kindler's fail-
ure to produce any evidence of prison conditions, psychological effects of prolonged de-
tention, or harm inflicted by the method of execution, precluded any finding of a violation
of Article 7. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 309 & n.7, 314.
96. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 314 (holding that Article 6 of the ICCPR does
not require the requested state to seek assurances, but noting that extradition decisions
may not be made "arbitrarily or summarily."). The UNHRC's decision in Kindler creates
an unusual paradox for requested states subject to the ICCPR. Although the requested
state need not seek any assurances under the ICCPR, the UNHRC's decision in Kindler
requires that the requested state consider any foreseeable risk of real harm within the re-
questing state. See id. at 313-14. Therefore, two options exist. First, a state could care-
fully weigh the possibility of harm, and, after deciding no risk existed, extradite without
assurances as was done in Kindler and Ng. See Ng v. Canada, Communication No.
469/1991, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40
(1994), at 189, 190; Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 307-08. Instead, the state could seek as-
surances against capital punishment and avoid any need to consider the possibility of
harm. Cf Marian Nash Leich, Extradition: Exemptions from Extradition, 1981-88
CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 746-47
(1993) (discussing the resolution in the aftermath of Soering, where the United Kingdom
received absolute assurance that Soering would not face the death penalty from both the
federal government and Virginia authorities, preventing violation of the European Con-
vention). By requesting assurances, there would be no possibility for violation of the
ICCPR because the requesting state would fulfill its ICCPR obligation (barring any other
type of human rights violation). Cf id. (noting the success of Soering's extradition once
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Despite its failure to find a violation of the ICCPR, the UNHRC es-
tablished several factors that should be examined in matters similar to
the Kindler case." These factors included the fugitive's relevant personal
attributes,98 the specific conditions on death row,99 and "whether the pro-
posed method of execution is particularly abhorrent."' ' The UNHRC
recognized the Soering decision, but distinguished it from the facts pres-
the assurances were received). Since this second option involves no risk of committing a
violation, a requested state is unlikely to choose the first option, barring other concerns,
since it leaves the state subject to a finding of a violation by the UNHRC if the UNHRC
does not agree with the requested state's assessment of the foreseeable risk of harm. See
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 45 (1989) (disagreeing with the U.K. Secretary of
State's assessment of harm, and finding that extradition violated the European Conven-
tion). Thus, while Kindler appears to leave the issue of seeking assurances untouched, im-
plicitly it provides a requested state with reason to seek assurances against capital punish-
ment. Cf. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 309 (stating that "a State party clearly is not
required to guarantee the rights of persons within another jurisdiction" but if the State
makes a decision regarding extradition, and the "necessary and foreseeable consequence is
that the person's rights will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be
in violation of the Covenant"). This implicit incentive to seek assurances must be weighed
by the requested state against the desire for amiable foreign relations and international
cooperation in criminal matters when it considers death penalty extradition. See id. at 311
(noting that Canada believed that asking for assurances would lead to an increase in the
number of fugitives seeking protection from American courts).
97. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 314.
98. See id. The UNHRC, giving "careful regard" to the European Court's decision in
Soering, considered the same personal factors as those used in Soering, namely age and
mental state. Id. Neither factor was relevant to Kindler, since he was above the age of
majority and introduced no evidence of mental state during his crime. See id.
99. See id. Kindler offered "no specific submissions" of any mistreatment or possible
effects of prolonged detention on death row. Id. at 311-12, 314. Instead, he relied primar-
ily upon the death row phenomenon argument on its face. See id. at 311-12. The
UNHRC, however, had already limited the scope of the argument, disagreeing with the
European Court in finding that "prolongued judicial proceedings do not per se constitute
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, even if they can be a source of mental strain for
the convicted persons." Id. at 309 (quoting its earlier decision in Pratt and Morgan v. Ja-
maica, Communication Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989)).
100. See id. at 314. The proposed method of execution in Pennsylvania was lethal in-
jection, which the Court agreed with Canada to be one of the least painful methods avail-
able. See id. at 311.
Once again, note the similarity between the UNHRC's approach and the approach
taken in Soering. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45 (stating that the condi-
tions on death row and the personal circumstances of Soering (age and mental state) were
important factors to be considered); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the foreseeability standard adopted by the European Court in Soering); supra note
92 (discussing the similarity of the two approaches used in Soering and Kindler). The main
difference in these decisions resulted from the UNHRC's refusal to recognize the death
row phenomenon as a component of ICCPR violations. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at
314. The Committee recognized that many of the delays in execution resulted from nu-
merous appeals by the prisoner, and therefore, it required a more extensive factual base to
support any challenge against the penal conditions within a requesting state. See id.
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ent in Kindler.'l ' The UNHRC noted that both age and mental state
were relevant concerns in Soering, but that those factors were not at is-
sue in Kindler. °2 The Committee also noted that Kindler had presented
little evidence as to prison conditions in Pennsylvania, the possible ef-
fects of the long delay before execution, or the chosen method of execu-
tion, lethal injection, which would support the finding of a violation.03
2. Same Rhyme, Different Reason: Ng v. Canada
Building upon the framework established in Kindler, the UNHRC, in
Ng v. Canada, °4 determined that a death penalty fugitive's extradition to
the United States would violate the ICCPR.105 By doing so, the UNHRC
clarified what types of conduct by the requesting state would violate the
ICCPR. Charles Chitat Ng, suspected of having committed twelve mur-
ders in California during 1984 and 1985,'6 fled to Canada, and subse-
quently was charged and convicted in Canada for killing a security guard
during a theft attempt.0 7 In 1987, U.S. authorities requested Ng's extra-
dition, and after several appeals, the Supreme Court of Canada held that
Ng's extradition without assurances, like Kindler's, did not violate the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.I1i
101. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 314.
102. See id.; see also supra note 98 (discussing Kindler's age and mental state).
103. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 314.
104. See Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 189.
105. See id. at 206.
106. See id. at 189. Charles Ng, a British subject born in Hong Kong and a U.S. resi-
dent, and his accomplice Leonard Lake feared the coming of a nuclear holocaust. See id.;
Charles Finnie, The Traveling Ng Show, 15-OCT Cal. Law. 39 (1995). In preparation, the
two men stocked their Calaveras County, California cabin and bunkers with weapons,
food, and "sex slaves." See id. The two men enticed or kidnapped their victims, inflicted
sexual torture, abuse, and ultimately death. See id. Both men fled to Canada and were
captured in 1985. See Ken Ellingwood, O.C. Gets 6 Tons of Paperwork on Transferred
Murder Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995, at B1. Lake killed himself with cyanide several
days after his arrest. See id. Ng spent over six years in Canada before his extradition to
the United States, which, through pure coincidence, occurred on the same day as Kindler's
extradition. See id.; see also Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 189; Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS.
L.J. at 308. Since returning to California, Ng has spent another seven years torturing the
California legal system, and as of January 1998, has not been tried. See Evidence De-
stroyed in Slaying in Which Mass Murder Suspect Is Charged, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19,1997, at
A33 [hereinafter Evidence Destroyed] (noting that Ng is scheduled for trial sometime in
1998). The cost of the trial, more than $6 million to date, far exceeds the cost of O.J.
Simpson's trial, and evidence linked to the case once had to be moved by an 18-wheeler
truck. See Ellingwood, supra; Finnie, supra, at 39.
107. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 189.
108. See id. at 189-90. The decision to extradite was made the same day as Kindler's
case, and after the cases were announced, Canadian authorities transferred both men back
[Vol. 47:535
Extradition Enigma
Unlike its decision in Kindler, the UNHRC disagreed with the Cana-
dian Minister of Justice's decision to extradite Ng, holding that the action
had violated the ICCPR.'1 ° Applying the test enunciated in Kindler, the
UNHRC focused almost exclusively upon the method of execution.
The UNHRC found that California's primary method of execution, cya-
nide gas asphyxiation, violated the ICCPR."' The UNHRC reaffirmed
that any punishment must "cause the least possible physical and mental
suffering" ' and that recent evidence concerning the use of the gas
chamber suggested that this method of execution caused significant pain
and agony. '13 Therefore, the UNHRC believed that the extradition of Ng
to California, without assurances, violated the ICCPR Article 7 require-
ment against "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.'. 4
The UNHRC requested that Canada attempt to persuade the United
States not to impose capital punishment, and take steps to ensure that
similar situations would not arise in the future."'
to U.S. soil within a matter of hours. See Highet & Kahale, supra note 91, at 128. Ng, like
Kindler, also had made an immediate appeal to the UNHRC, which subsequently was ig-
nored by the Canadian government. See id. at 131.
109. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 205.
110. See id. The UNHRC made no mention of Ng's age or mental state, most likely
because Ng's counsel relied extensively upon the death row phenomenon argument, and
did not raise the other factors. See id. at 199-200, 205 (noting that Ng's counsel quoted
from the Soering decision, and argued that the death row phenomenon provided a basis
for finding a violation of the ICCPR). The only mention of the "personal factors" consid-
ered in Soering, and mentioned in Kindler, was that the death row phenomenon had pro-
duced an effect on Ng's mental state while in prison. See id. at 200; see also supra notes 98-
100 and accompanying text (outlining the relevant factors used in Kindler).
111. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 205. Ng provided evidence that cyanide gas
asphyxiation could take up to twelve minutes to kill its victim, with noticeable pain and
agony. See id. at 200.
112. Id. at 205. The UNHRC reaffirmed the standard it originally set forth in General
Comment 20[44] on Article 7 of the ICCPR. See id.
113. See id. Ng submitted evidence that during execution by cyanide gas, victims often
remained conscious, suffered obvious pain and agony, convulsed, drooled, and soiled
themselves. See id. at 200.
114. Id. at 205; see also ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 7, at 175.
115. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 206. Whether the request will be followed,
or if it will be successful, remains to be seen since Ng has yet to stand trial. See Evidence
Destroyed, supra note 106, at A33. The conflict that arose in Ng is still a matter a debate
between the Canadian executive and judicial branches. In December of 1997, a Canadian
appeals court blocked the decision of the Justice Minister of Canada to extradite two Ca-
nadians to Washington state without assurances against capital punishment. See Top Can-
ada Court Takes Extradition Case, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma), Dec. 5, 1997, at B3. The case
was accepted for review by the Supreme Court of Canada, which will face issues almost
identical to those presented in Ng. See id.
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The Ng decision established that the UNHRC was willing to tread the
same ground as the European Court in Soering."6 The UNHRC ex-
pressed a desire that requested states incorporate ICCPR standards into
their extradition proceedings.117 Similar to the affect of Soering on states
party to the European Convention, the Ng and Kindler decisions helped
to create a level of uniformity for nations party to ICCPR by establishing
the obligations of requested states in death penalty extraditions.
C. A New World Order? Death Penalty Extradition After Soering,
Kindler, and Ng
The decisions of the European Court and the UNHRC resolved the
conflict between human rights and extradition with a clear winner-hu-
man rights."' After the decisions in Soering, Kindler, and Ng, little doubt
116. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 204-205. The UNHRC performed the same
balancing that took place in Soering, namely, national sovereignty versus human rights.
Cf id. (weighing the interests of the Canadian government against the obligations of the
ICCPR). Like the European Court, the UNHRC applied the ICCPR in a way that eroded
national sovereignty in favor of broader application of human rights principles. Cf. id. at
192, 204-05 (deciding that the UNHRC had jurisdiction for claims of human rights viola-
tions during extradition proceedings, and stating that in certain circumstances, the obliga-
tions of the ICCPR would outweigh national interests and extradition treaty obligations);
see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing how Soering advances human
rights at the expense of national sovereignty).
117. See id. at 203 ("A State party to the Covenant must ensure that it carries out all
its other legal commitments in a manner consistent with the Covenant.").
118. See id. at 203-04. A nation party to the ICCPR must, after the decisions in Kin-
dler and Ng, consider whether there is a real, foreseeable risk that extradition will lead to a
violation of the ICCPR. See id. at 203; Kindler v. Canada, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307, 309
(1993).
119. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36 (1989) (requiring that member
states make extradition decisions in light of their obligations under the European Conven-
tion). Clearly, the European Court believed that regardless of the safeguards provided
within an extradition treaty, the European Convention warranted independent considera-
tion. See Donnelly, supra note 74, at 347 (stating that member states must give priority to
the European Convention over concurrent extradition treaty obligations); Roecks, supra
note 29, at 205-06 (arguing that Soering held that the European Convention provides fugi-
tives with substantive and procedural rights).
The UNHRC took a view similar to the European Court, but was less assertive about
the need for assurances against capital punishment as safeguards against violation of the
ICCPR. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 313-14 (stating that a member state must exe-
cute all treaty obligations "in a manner consistent with" the ICCPR, however, the Article
6 provision, discussing the death penalty does not mandate assurances against capital
punishment).
To underscore the importance of the decisions by these bodies, it is important to note
the effect of their respective human rights agreements. As of 1993, 32 nations have joined
the European Convention, with new applications for membership from Central and East-
ern Europe under consideration. See Bernhardt, supra note 28, at 300-01. By 1993, over
122 nations were signatories to the ICCPR. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 27, at xlvii. In
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remains that human rights agreements, in the eyes of international hu-
man rights bodies, take precedence over bilateral extradition treaties,
particularly when the death penalty is involved. ° The notion of the sov-
ereign state engaging in extradition procedures uninhibited by judicial
control no longer has a place under the new human rights regime."
In light of the decisions of the European Court and the UNHRC, a
state engaging in death penalty extradition must be aware of three new
considerations. First, when the requested state is member to a human
rights agreement, such as the European Convention or the ICCPR, and
is extraditing to a non-member state, it still must comply with the rele-
vant obligations imposed by that agreement.' 3 More simply stated, the
member state's obligation to prevent foreseeable harm does not stop at
its border.12 ' This obligation typically falls under the responsibility of the
1992, the United States became the 115th nation to ratify the ICCPR. See William A.
Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is
the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 277 (1995). The U.S. ratifica-
tion of the ICCPR has raised numerous problems, primarily because the Senate included
controversial reservations, including two reservations aimed at limiting the application of
the ICCPR to U.S. capital punishment. See id. at 277-80. For a complete discussion of the
United States' ratification of the ICCPR, see generally U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer
eds., 1993).
120. See O'Boyle, supra note 53, at 106 (stating that extradition to jurisdictions that
retain the death penalty will be more difficult and perhaps impossible for member states of
the European Convention); Roecks, supra note 29, at 215-16 (noting that Kindler and Ng
obligate ICCPR member states to assess whether the penal systems of requesting states
meet ICCPR human rights standards).
121. See Shea, supra note 9, at 111 (stating that Soering provided grounds upon which
national courts could depart from the rule of non-inquiry and examine the human rights
records of requesting states); see also Roecks, supra note 29, at 216 (noting that Kin-
dler and Ng turned the requested state into a "human rights forum," where the human
rights condition of non-member states will be judged by the standards of the ICCPR).
122. Cf. Roecks, supra note 29, at 205-06 (describing the effects of Soering on a state's
ability to extradite death penalty fugitives).
123. See Kindler, 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. at 156 ("If a State party extradites a person within
its jurisdiction in such circumstances that as a result there is a real risk that his or her rights
under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in
violation of the Covenant."); see also Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (stating that
"in the Court's view this inherent obligation not to extradite [under certain threat of tor-
ture, inhuman or degrading punishment] also extends to cases in which the fugitive would
be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment..." (emphasis added)).
124. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35. The requested state must not
only protect a fugitive's rights inside its own borders, but it also must provide constructive
protection of the fugitive's rights outside its borders once the fugitive is in the requesting
state. See id. In essence, a fugitive is given a set of rights he would not otherwise have
(unless the requesting state is party to the applicable human rights agreement), and carries
these rights with him into the requesting state. See Roecks, supra note 29, at 205, 215-16
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head of state, when the requested nation's law gives the head of state dis-
cretion in making such decisions.125 Before the state may extradite, the
head of state must consider not only violations of the agreement result-
ing in real harm within the state's own jurisdiction, but also any foresee-
able violations within the requesting state.26 Second, the member state
must incorporate these obligations into its extradition law.127 Review of
an extradition decision cannot be limited solely to the language of an ex-
tradition treaty; it also must include scrutiny of the requesting state's le-
gal and penal system for compliance with the standards of the relevant
human rights agreement. In practical terms, this means that a review of
(noting that Soering, Kindler, and Ng provide procedural and substantive rights to fugi-
tives by requiring the requested state to assess the requesting state's compliance with hu-
man rights protections).
125. See GILBERT, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that "it is left to the executive to make
its own decision on the case before authorising the fugitive's surrender..."); Semmelman,
supra note 10, at 1198 (stating that, in the United States, "[a] defendant who anticipates
unfair or abusive treatment following extradition may seek relief on that ground only from
the Secretary of State, who has discretion to deny the extradition request").
126. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (refusing to absolve requested states
from responsibility for "all and any foreseeable consequences of extradition suffered out-
side their jurisdiction"); see also Kindler, 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. at 309, 313 (holding the re-
quested state responsible for any foreseeable risk of real harm within the requesting state).
127. Cf Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36 (finding that where a real risk of
violation exists, the member state has a responsibility under the European Convention to
refuse extradition); Roecks, supra note 29, at 200 (noting how the European Court
meshed extradition law with the obligations of the European Convention when it found
"an 'inherent obligation not to extradite' if it was foreseeable that the fugitive would be
subjected to torture in the requesting state).
The UNHRC also incorporated obligations under the ICCPR into extradition law. See
Kindler, 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 314. The UNHRC noted that while Canada itself did not
impose the death penalty, any extradition that involved a real risk of a violation of Article
6 of the ICCPR (the provision concerning the death penalty) would be a violation en-
forceable against the member state. See id. In addition, Article 2(3)(b) of the ICCPR re-
quires that member states protect individuals by ensuring judicial, administrative, or legal
review of claims. See ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(3)(b), at 174. Although the language of
the provision appears to provide broad discretion to states in determining how to satisfy
this protection, states nevertheless must apply the ICCPR to any governmental entity that
addresses a matter involving a ICCPR-based right. See Quigley, supra note 55, at 1224
n.71.
128. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 313; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-
36. For example, in Soering, the European Court stated that the "object and purpose" of
the European Convention required that its provisions be interpreted and applied in a way
that made the protections offered "practical and effective." Id. at 34. The Court ex-
panded Article 3 of the European Convention to encompass extradition by finding that
any contrary result would be incompatible with the "underlying values" of the Conven-
tion. Id. at 35. After Soering, any requested state within the European Convention must
consider not only practiced extradition law, but also potential human rights violations
within the requesting state. See id. at 36 (stating that an extradition decision, in addition
to traditional procedure, "inevitably involves an assessment of conditions in the requesting
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the head of state's decision to extradite should be provided, and it must
go beyond traditional extradition law by providing a greater focus on
human rights. 9 Third, to comply with the two previous principals, na-
tional courts in the requested state should abandon the rule of non-
inquiry and become active participants in the extradition process.13
country against the standards of Article 3 of the [European] Convention");
see also Quigley, supra note 6, at 426 (noting that Soering made the European Convention
an integral part of extradition decisions in the United Kingdom).
129. Cf Quigley, supra note 6, at 438-39 (commenting that "[I]f a rule of non-inquiry
exists, [which leaves the decision in the hands of the executive,] it is inconsistent with hu-
man rights law" and requires courts to refuse extradition to a state which may violate the
fugitive's human rights).
130. Cf Quigley, supra note 55, at 1224-25 (stating that the UNHRC expects national
courts to enforce the protections created within the ICCPR). These protections are appli-
cable to extradition proceedings. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 313-14; see also
O'Boyle, supra note 53, at 106-07 (noting that Soering increased the involvement of do-
mestic courts in extradition proceedings); Shea, supra note 9, at 111 (noting that Soering
presented the opportunity for European judges to abandon the rule of non-inquiry in ex-
tradition proceedings). On the most basic level, the co-existence of human rights law and
the rule of non-inquiry cannot be maintained. See Quigley, supra note 6, at 438. As inter-
national courts create greater protections for individuals subject to extradition, as in So-
ering, national courts may be persuaded, or even forced, to block extradition on humani-
tarian grounds. See O'Boyle, supra note 53, at 106-07 (noting that Soering will provide
persuasive reasoning for domestic courts subject to human rights agreements similar to the
European Convention).
Neither the European Court nor the UNHRC expressly called for greater judicial in-
volvement. See supra Parts II.A.-B (discussing the holdings of the European Court and
the UNHRC). The reasoning in the cases of these two quasi-judicial bodies, however,
provides a solid foundation upon which a domestic court may expand the nature of its in-
quiry. See Shea, supra note 9, at 111. Involving domestic courts may be highly desirable
for requested states, since both the European Court and the UNHRC pay particular atten-
tion to judicial proceedings within the requested state. See, e.g., Ng v. Canada, Communi-
cation No. 469/1991, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc.
A/49/40 (1994), at 189; Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, views adopted
on July 30, 1993, 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 307, 314 (1993); Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
16-20. In addition, neither the European Court nor the UNHRC may hear a matter until
all domestic remedies have been exhausted. See ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 41(1)(c), at 182;
European Convention, supra note 6, art. 26, at 238. Therefore, a requested state may
maintain control over its extradition decisions and mitigate the involvement of interna-
tional courts by increasing the involvement of their domestic courts. Cf Quigley, supra
note 55, at 1223-29 (discussing the enforcement obligations of national courts, and the sub-
sequent interpretation of those obligations by national courts). Finally, both the ICCPR
and the European Convention contain provisions which anticipate that domestic courts
will be active participants in enforcing human rights protections. See ICCPR, supra note
7, art. 2(3)(b), at 174 (providing that parties to the ICCPR must ensure that a "competent
judicial, administrative or legislative authorit[y]" determines the rights of the individuals
under the ICCPR); European Convention, supra note 6, art. 13, at 232 (stating that
"[e]veryone ... shall have an effective remedy before a national authority"); see also
Quigley, supra note 55, at 1224-25 (noting that the UNHRC emphasizes the priority of
national courts enforcing ICCPR obligations and polls domestic courts to determine the
level of compliance).
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Rather than limit its inquiry to procedural matters within the requested
state, courts should examine any possible violation of human rights
agreements resulting from extradition."' In essence, courts should take
an active role in ensuring that the state complies with the first two con-
132
siderations.
The application of these three general principles result in an increased
"internationalization of domestic adjudication." '133 National courts, free
from their traditional restraints, may begin to participate in the pro-
131. See Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 313-14; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
34-36. Naturally, this must be the case if the state wishes to prevent a violation of the hu-
man rights agreement. See id. at 44-45 (finding that extradition, although permissible un-
der the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, would trigger a violation of Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention). Of course, violations still may be avoided under the traditional
extradition practice, which leaves the decision largely within the discretion of the head of
state. See Kindler, 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. at 314 (finding that the Canadian Minister of Jus-
tice's decision not to extradite did not violate the ICCPR because the decision was made
after "careful consideration"). But see infra Part IV (discussing Venezia and the Italian
Constitutional Court's finding that the discretionary power to extradite, left in the hands
of the Justice Minister, was contrary to the Italian Constitution). The involvement of the
judiciary, however, would provide greater protection against the intervention of interna-
tional human rights bodies and the surrendering of national sovereignty to international
human rights interests. See supra note 75, (discussing the erosion of national sovereignty
by human rights law); infra note 133 (discussing the responsibilities and benefits of domes-
tic court involvement in extradition decisions).
132. See Francesco Francioni, The Jurisprudence of International Human Rights En-
forcement: Reflections on the Italian Experience, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 15, 16 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds.,
1997) (stating that "national judges have greater opportunities and responsibilities than in
the past, both for shaping a new consciousness of international human rights in domestic
law, and for providing effective remedies against breaches... [which are] an indispensable
instrument for expanding the scope of the judicial function [into human rights]"); A.W.
Bradley, The United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights, and Constitutional
Review, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 249 (1995) (stating that "there appears to be emerging
a sort of European quasi-constitutional or common law, the maintenance of whose uni-
form minimum standards is considered the responsibility not only of the [European] Con-
vention's organs but also that of the domestic judiciary").
133. Lillich, supra note 53, at 713 (quoting Judge Buergenthal). This quotation refer-
ences the decisions in Soering, Kindler, and Ng, which helped to advance the process by
which international adjudication permeates domestic law. See id. These decisions provide
a solid basis for national courts to adopt standards analogous to those developed by inter-
national human rights bodies. See id. at 711-12; see also Shea, supra note 9, at 111. The
decisions do not represent binding precedents, but nevertheless provide a source of per-
suasive authority and justification for greater domestic judicial involvement in the human
rights arena. See Lillich, supra note 53, at 712.
134. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing traditional extradition
law and the rule of non-inquiry). Although the decisions in Soering, Kindler, and Ng pro-
vide the reasoning to enable a court to free itself from traditional restraints, not all courts
have been willing to do so. See Shea, supra note 9, at 113-14 (noting the initial reluctance
of U.K. courts to fully adopt the Soering reasoning).
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gressive development of international human rights jurisprudence)35 Be-
cause nearly all advances have resulted from the holdings of interna-
tional bodies, most national courts consider decisions such as Soering,
Kindler, and Ng valuable guides for the venture into international human
rights adjudication. 36
III. THE VENEZIA DECISION: THE SOVEREIGN NATION REDEFINED?
The Italian Constitutional Court, in Venezia, faced a situation similar
to those faced by the European Court in Soering and the UNHRC in
Kindler and Ng. The Court had to balance its "human rights agree-
ment"-the Italian Constitution-against the need for international co-
operation in criminal matters and favorable relations with the United
States)3 Like the European Court and UNHRC, the Italian Court con-
cluded that extraditing a fugitive to the United States to face a real risk
of capital punishment would violate Italy's "agreement" if extradition
occurred.38 Thus, the Court applied its agreement (the Italian Constitu-
tion) to a nation not party to the protections explicitly afforded by that
agreement, and therefore placed those protections above Italy's bilateral
treaty obligation with the United States.'39
A. From Pasta to Prison-The Rise and Fall of Pietro Venezia
Italian national Pietro Venezia came to America in 1977, working for
several years as a waiter at local Italian restaurants.' 40 In 1988, Venezia
bought his own restaurant, an upscale establishment named Buccione's
135. See Lillich, supra note 53, at 701-02, 713. Many commentators, including Torkel
Opsahl, a former member of the UNHRC, believed that the future development of human
rights would come both directly and indirectly from national courts. See id. at 701-02 &
n.14; see also discussion infra Parts IV, V (arguing that Venezia represents a significant
advance in human rights by a national court).
136. See Lillich, supra note 53, at 700-02, 711-13 (noting that reference to international
human rights standards, as interpreted by international human rights bodies, has become
more commonplace in national courts throughout the world).
137. See In re Venezia, June 25,1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 4 to 5 (con-
trasting the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, and its goal of "reciprocal judicial assistance"
against the Italian Constitution, and its "absolute guarantee" of the right to life).
138. See id. (stating that the right to life is an "absolute parameter" under Italian law,
and therefore the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty's provision allowing "assurances" to be
given to the Justice Minister is unconstitutional and extradition cannot occur).
139. See id. pt. II, para. 4 (stating that the right to life is an absolute guarantee to be
measured against "the Constitutional legitimacy of the general law granting extradition...
and of the laws that provide for the execution of international treaties on extradition, and
judicial assistance").
140. See Arnold Markowitz, Pasta to Die For?, MIAMI HERALD, May 29, 1994, at 6.
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in Miami's Coconut Grove.T4 Venezia's restaurant was initially profit-
able, bringing in over one million dollars in revenue in 1989.142 Venezia's
income tax returns, however, showed cumulative losses of over one mil-
lion dollars during a subsequent four-and-a-half year period. In addi-
tion, starting in 1990, Venezia continually failed to pay the monthly sales
tax to state officials.1
44
Over his years as a restaurateur, Venezia had established an elite clien-
tele, which included mayors, executives, lawyers, and several prominent
federal and state judges.4 1 When a major judicial corruption scandal sur-
faced in mid-1991, Venezia, who had apparently been looking the other
way while bribes were passed, was forced to testify against several of his
patrons.146  As a result, Venezia's power lunch pasta haven suffered a
drastic drop in business as former customers avoided Buccione's, fearing
that the scandal was contagious.
4 1
Besides the problems caused by the courtroom scandal, Venezia also
suffered from financial problems caused by his failure to pay state sales
141. See id. Venezia'a first restaurant, named Tarantino's after his home province in
Italy, opened in 1981. See id. In 1988, Venezia bought Buccione's for $600,000. See id.
Venezia had troubles with the government from the start. See id. When the Florida Divi-
sion of Alcohol, Beverage, and Tobacco investigated Venezia's financial backers for Buc-
cione's, it found that seven of the thirteen listed investors claimed they had no involve-
ment in financing the enterprise. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. Venezia avoided using a cash register until 1992. See id. Venezia simply
told patrons what they owed, and evidence suggested that he often double-billed and pad-
ded bills. See id.
144. See id. Venezia also failed to pay a $600 accident insurance judgment, a $700 res-
taurant supply bill, and a $2,000-plus roof repair bill for his house. See id.
145. See id. Among his regular customers were Florida county court Judge Alfonso
Sepe and former Circuit Judge John Gale. See id. Venezia's association with power paid
off when he was arrested for drunk driving in 1984 and Judge Sepe sealed the record and
reduced Venezia's punishment to a $300 fine. See id. For that, the judge received several
"on the house" meals. Id. Venezia also often took payment for Sepe's regular lunches
from a defense attorney who was friends with the judge. See id. In exchange, the judge
would appoint the attorney to indigent defendants at state expense. See id. Venezia's
other friend on the bench, Judge Gale, frequented his establishment but rarely was seen
paying the bill. See id.
146. See id. Venezia testified only after giving several perjurious statements. See id.
First, after testifying that he had records of Judge Sepe's attorney-sponsored lunches,
Venezia claimed he had lost the records. See id. He then claimed he destroyed the rec-
ords to protect the judge. See id. Finally, Venezia turned over the records, which where
as incriminating for Venezia as they were for Sepe. See id. The records showed that
Venezia had an unusual billing system which often involved padding bills or double-
charging customers. See id. Ultimately, the defense attorney who had paid for Judge
Sepe's lunches, upwards of $10,000, was indicted by a federal grand jury and later con-
victed of bribery. See id.
147. See id.
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tax.' In December 1993, the Florida Department of Revenue froze
Venezia's account, based on a delinquent tax bill of over $41,000.149
Venezia received a notice of action, signed by Collection and Enforce-
ment Specialist Donald Bonham.5 ° Venezia, enraged, tracked Bonham
down and shot him four times at the doorstep of his house.'51 Several
days later, Venezia left the country."'2
An international manhunt ensued, lasting more than four months be-
fore authorities finally tracked down Venezia in his home province of
Taranto, Italy."' In April 1994, armed with an international arrest war-
rant and posing as insurance adjusters, Italian police approached
Venezia's childhood home in Laterza and captured Venezia when he an-
swered the door. Before reaching the local police station, Venezia
broke down crying, and made a full confession."5
148. See id. Florida authorities imposed a tax lien for delinquent sales tax payments
totaling over $23,000. See id.
149. See id. The tax inspections evidently began soon after the judicial corruption
trial, where Venezia testified against Judge Sepe. See id Venezia completed a deposition
for the FBI about the bribery charge, which, in turn, sparked an investigation into his tax
practices. See Robert Graham, Allies at Odds over Extradition, FIN. TIMES (London), July
8, 1996, at 9.
150. See Markowitz, supra note 140, at 6. Bonham signed the order, but did not have
any direct participation in the actual decision. See id.
151. See id. On December 23, 1993, Venezia called the tax office where Bonham
worked and threatened to kill tax workers. See id. Immediately prior to the shooting at
11:30 a.m. on December 24, 1995, neighbors saw Venezia prowling Bonham's neighbor-
hood for some time. See id. Bonham had just returned from the grocery store with arms
full of groceries when Venezia approached him and began shouting. See id. After a brief
exchange, Venezia shot Bonham multiple times, then returned to his car and drove away.
See id. Venezia has since claimed the gun went off accidentally. See Italian to Stand Trial,
SUN SENTINEL (South Fla.), Apr. 16, 1997, at 30.
152. See Markowitz, supra note 140, at 6. Prior to leaving the country on December
27, 1993, Venezia confessed to his girlfriend, a commercial litigation lawyer, and also
typed a letter of confession. See id. The letter blamed both the government and the me-
dia for destroying Venezia's business and forcing him to kill. See id. Together, Venezia
and his girlfriend contacted a defense firm, and went to the firm's office early on Decem-
ber 27, 1993. See id. While at the office, Venezia destroyed all copies of his letter and
then left the country. See id.
153. See id. Neither the lawyers nor Venezia's girlfriend knew Venezia's whereabouts,
but authorities had a strong suspicion that he had left for Italy. See id. The FBI sent in-
formation about the case to Rome, but diplomatic bureaucracy delayed the investigation
for two months before Italian officials in Venezia's home province of Taranto received it.
See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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B. Crier for the Cause
After Venezia confessed, the United States and Italy began extradition
proceedings."' In November 1994, a local appeals court approved the ex-
tradition request,' but Venezia appealed the decision to the national
court of appeals. 58 One year later, the appeals court upheld the decision
of the lower court. The Italian Justice Minister' 6° subsequently re-
viewed the extradition request, pursuant to the 1983 extradition treaty
between the United States and Italy and Italian extradition procedure.1
61
Pursuant to his power, the Justice Minister asked for assurances from
U.S. officials that the death penalty would not be imposed . After the
U.S. Department of Justice gave its assurances against capital punish-
ment, the Italian Justice Minister gave final approval to the extradition
request on December 14, 1995.163
156. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9. Pursuant to the treaty between the United
States and Italy, the United States made a certified request for extradition to the Italian
government. See id.; see also U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 46, art. X, at 3031-
33 (outlining the necessary documents that must accompany an extradition request). For
fugitives not yet convicted in a U.S. or Italian Court, Article X of the treaty requires the
following: 1) information identifying the probable location of the fugitive, and a physical
description; 2) a statement describing the facts of the case; 3) copies of the relevant law
describing the elements of the charged offense; 4) copies of the relevant law describing the
available punishments for the offense; 5) copies of the laws describing the statute of limita-
tions for prosecution for the offense; 6) "a certified copy of the arrest warrant"; 7) a sum-
mary of facts and evidence providing a "reasonable basis" for the belief that the fugitive
committed the offense; and 8) documents authenticating that the fugitive sought is the
person named in the arrest warrant. See id. at 3031-33.
157. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. At the time in question, the Justice Minister's duties were being performed by
Prime Minister Lamberto Dini. See id. The Justice Minister, under Italian law, is en-
trusted with the discretionary authority to deny or approve extradition. See In re Venezia,
June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 3.1.
161. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9.
162. See id. Under Article 698 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, death pen-
alty extradition may take place only when assurances are received that the death penalty
will not be imposed. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 4 to
5. Evaluation of the sufficiency of the assurance was left within the Justice Minister's dis-
cretion. See id.
163. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9; see also Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appen-
dix, infra, pt. II, paras. 4 to 5 (discussing the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure require-
ment that assurances against capital punishment be sought before extradition is granted).
The Dade County prosecutor who attempted to gain Venezia's extradition agreed not to
seek the death penalty, and her agreement was forwarded to the Italian government via
the Justice Department. See John Tagliabue, Italians' Extradition Ruling May Hamper
War on Organized Crime, HOUSTON CHRON., June 28, 1996, at 22A.
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During this time, Venezia's attorneys created strong public and politi-
cal support for Venezia.1 4 The death penalty in Italy was the subject of
considerable debate,16 ' and Venezia's case became an ideal opportunity
for anti-death penalty groups to rally together.' 66 The case gained politi-
cal significance,167 and the extradition order was blocked by the ruling of
164. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9. Venezia's lawyers approached members of the
Italian Parliament, gaining support from members of various Italian political parties. See
id. In addition, a league of citizens and members of Parliament mobilized to protest the
extradition. See STEFANO ANASTASIA, IL CASO VENEZIA 34 (1996) (in Italian). The
group held sit-ins and protests before the Italian Ministry of Justice and the Italian Par-
liament in opposition of Venezia's extradition. See id.
165. See Tagliabue, supra note 163, at 22A. According to an Italian survey conducted
in 1991, nearly 60% of Italians favored re-introducing the death penalty. See id. By Feb-
ruary 1996, that number dropped to 45.7%. See id. The Italian Constitution, since its ap-
proval in 1947, has prohibited the death penalty, except in certain military cases in war-
time. See id.; see also COST. [Constitution] art. 27 (Italy).
166. Cf. Tagliabue, supra note 163, at 22A (noting the reactions of various political
members and anti-death penalty groups). Opponents of the death penalty, including sev-
eral members of the Italian government, believed that Venezia's case presented the op-
portunity, through a Constitutional Court decision, to eliminate any possibility of the re-
introduction of the death penalty. See Extradition Blocked Over Death Penalty,
EDMONTON J. (Canada), June 28, 1996, at F12. [hereinafter Extradition Blocked]; Italy
Denies Extradition of Dade Suspect. Ruling Seeks to Save Man Wanted in Murder From
Electric Chair, SUN SENTINEL (South Fla.), June 28, 1996, at 12A [hereinafter Italy Denies
Extradition].
167. See Italy Denies Extradition, supra note 166, at 12A. Giovanni Leone, former
Italian President, gave significant support to Venezia's cause, describing it as "one of his-
toric character." See Tagliabue, supra note 163, at 22A. In addition, at the initiative of
Parliament member Pietro A16, a motion was submitted to Parliament. See ANASTASIA,
supra note 164, at 35-45. The motion led to a debate over the nature of the American sys-
tem, where many members of Parliament expressed their doubt about the sufficiency of
U.S. assurances. See id. In the opinion of several Italian Senators, the U.S. Constitution
gave the states complete autonomy in handling state law crimes, and therefore assurances
from the federal government were unenforceable. See id. The Senate also noted the ini-
tial failure of the Governor of Florida to provide independent assurances, as well as the
cultural and political environment of Florida. See id. Senator A16, along with other mem-
bers, stressed that capital punishment had been a priority of the current Governor, and
upcoming elections in Florida could cast doubt on any assurances made by the Governor.
See id. The Italian Senate motion passed unanimously, and called for the refusal of extra-
dition by the Justice of Ministry. See id. The Justice Minister, however, signed the extra-
dition decree, and Venezia was secretly transported to Rome. See id. Senator Alb man-
aged to block the immediate extradition, so Venezia could see his family one last time.
See id. During this period, the Ministry of Justice announced that sufficient assurances
had been received, and extradition would proceed despite the Senate motion. See id. Af-
ter the announcement, the Italian House of Representatives approved a new motion ask-
ing the government not to extradite Venezia, and to refer the matter to Parliament. See
id. These sequence of events eventually helped lead to the case coming before the Italian
Constitutional Court. See id.
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a regional administrative tribunal."" The tribunal then forwarded the
case to the Italian Constitutional Court.'69
C. The "Right to Life" and "Assurances" Revisited
By the time the case reached the Italian Constitutional Court, political
sentiment had reached a zenith. 70 Support for the refusal of Venezia's
extradition reached across political lines. 17' Many viewed the Venezia
case as a contest between Italian sovereignty and American strong-arm
politics. 7 In addition, Italy was displeased with current practices by the
U.S. judicial system. 173 Venezia's supporters felt that the case provided
the perfect opportunity to simultaneously silence Italian support for the
death penalty, establish Italy as a world leader in the international aboli-
tionist movement, and send a political message to the United States.'74
Under substantial public pressure, the Italian Constitutional Court struck
down the implementing legislation for the capital punishment provision
of the 1983 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty and analogous portions of the
168. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9. After garnering substantial political support,
Venezia's lawyers brought a special appeal before the Rome regional administrative tri-
bunal which resulted in a suspension of the Justice Minister's decision to proceed with ex-
tradition. See id.
169. See id. at 9. For a discussion of the Italian Constitutional Court, see infra Part
IV.B.
170. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text (discussing the political forces at
work in Italy during Venezia's attempted extradition).
171. See Extradition Blocked, supra note 166, at F12. Support for Venezia crossed the
political spectrum, including the Communist Refoundation Party, the Party of the Demo-
cratic Left, the Green Party, the CDU Party, the National Alliance Party, and the Forza
Italia Party. See ANSASTASIA, supra note 164, at 37-39; Extradition Blocked, supra note
166, at F12; Graham, supra note 149, at 9.
172. See Extradition Blocked, supra note 166, at F12. Italy's Deputy Speaker of the
Senate described the controversy as a battle between the Italian Constitution and attempts
to put "'political relations with the United States"' before Italy's basic rights. Id. The
Deputy Speaker's position can be attributed to the fact that many Italians disapprove of
the American way of life and dislike American politics. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9.
173. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9. The Italian media provides broad coverage of
executions in the United States, usually accompanied by negative commentary on the
American judicial and penal system. See id. Public sentiment also was affected by recent
difficulties surrounding the case of Silvia Baraldini, an Italian national convicted of ter-
rorism. See id. Italian officials tried for several years to obtain transfer of Baraldini to It-
aly to serve the remainder of her sentence, but U.S. officials refused on grounds that they
believed her treatment in Italy "would be too soft." Id.
174. See Italy Denies Extradition, supra note 166, at 12A. One member of the Italian
government stated that, "'[tihis sentence reiterates without a shadow of doubt the princi-
ple that our judicial system completely rejects the death penalty,"' Graham, supra note
149, at 9, and that the decision represented a "victory for human dignity." Italy Denies
Extradition, supra note 166, at 12A.
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Italian Code of Criminal Procedure as contrary to the Italian Constitu-
tion.Y
In Venezia, the Italian Constitutional Court expressed two primary
concerns. First, the court stated that the Italian Constitution provides an
absolute "right to life" and explained that this guarantee must be applied
in extradition proceedings involving countries that impose the death
penalty.' The court noted that although the treaty between the United
States and Italy offered the flexibility of assurances against the death
penalty, the right to life is absolute, and any decision to extradite must be
examined in light of that absolute right. 7 1 Consequently, both the deci-
175. See In re Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 2.2. The
Court invalidated Article 698, paragraph 2, of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure,
which provided for the review of extradition requests by both a judicial court and the Jus-
tice Minister, as well as the domestic legislation implementing the U.S.-Italy Extradition
Treaty. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 5. The legislation
left the adequacy of assurances provided by the requesting state within the discretion of
the Justice Minister. See id.
As late as 1993, the Italian government had extradited a death penalty fugitive to the
United States without incident. See Italy Refuses to Return Murder Suspect, TAMPA TRIB.,
June 28, 1996, at 2. The case involved John Barret Hawkins, a California resident wanted
in connection with a murder-for-insurance scam. See id. In order to obtain Hawkins' ex-
tradition, California authorities were forced to forego the death penalty. See Judy Shay,
Hawkins Won't Face Execution: Penalty Bid Dropped to Allow Extradition, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 4, 1991, at 3. Hawkins unsuccessfully challenged the decision before the Ital-
ian Supreme Court. See Judy Shay, Hawkins' Extradition Endorsed, Murder-for-insurance
Suspect Loses Appeal, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 30, 1992, at 3. This was the same court
that endorsed Venezia's extradition but later was overruled by the Italian Constitutional
Court. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9. Hawkins, on the other hand, was extradited to
the United States and sentenced to 25 years to life. See Italy Refuses to Return Murder
Suspect, supra, at 2.
176. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 3.1 to 4. The
Constitutional Court concluded that the constitutional protection of the right to life rose
above the need for international judicial assistance and was applicable to any and all gov-
ernment actions. See id. pt. II, para. 5. This position is very similar to that taken by the
UNHRC and European Court when applying the protections contained in the ICCPR and
the European Convention. See supra Part II.C (discussing the practical effects of the deci-
sions by the UNHRC and European Court). It is argued that the European Court and
UNHRC have evolved into international constitutional courts, enforcing their obligations
in a manner consistent with the practice of a national constitutional court. See Bernhardt,
supra note 28, at 301-04 (stating that the European Convention has become a "'Human
Rights Constitution'" with the European Court as its ultimate interpreter).
177. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 3.1 to 5. Simply
stated, the court held that no flexibility exists for the Italian government-either the as-
surance provides an absolute guarantee, or it must be refused. See id. Any contrary re-
sult, in the court's view, would abrogate the right to life protected by the Italian Constitu-
tion. See id.
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sion of the national court and the Justice Minister could be challenged on
grounds that this affirmative duty was not executed.178
The Italian Constitutional Court's second concern focused on the na-
ture of "assurances.' '179 The court first noted the opinion of the lower
court administrative judge that any assurances given by the U.S. federal
government could not be sufficient, because Venezia's trial would take
place in a Florida state court where federal assurances would have ques-
tionable enforceability.' Later in its argument, however, the court
stated there was "no question" as to the interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 8' and rejected Venezia's concerns as to
the enforceability of the U.S. federal government's assurances.' 1  The
court neglected to expand on either of these views, leaving an unan-
swered question as to its position on the issue. 83 Rather than resolve
178. See id. pt. I, para 2.2; id. pt. II, para 3.1. Thus, the court rejected the Italian gov-
ernment's contention that Venezia's appeal to the Italian Supreme Court had resolved the
issue of constitutional violation. See id., pt. II, para. 2. The court held that where a right
as basic as the right to life is concerned, a narrow review, such as the one performed by the
Italian Supreme Court, is insufficient and could be revisited. See id. pt. II, paras. 3 to 3.1.
179. See id. pt. II, para 5. Like the bilateral extradition treaties between the United
States and the United Kingdom and the United States and Canada, the U.S.-Italy Extradi-
tion Treaty allowed for death penalty extradition if the requesting state provided sufficient
assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed. See U.S.-Italy Extradition
Treaty, supra note 46, art. IX, at 3031.
180. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 2.4. The U.S. Con-
stitution forbids states to enter into treaties with foreign nations. See U.S. CONST., art. I, §
10, cl. 1. Therefore, any extradition pursuant to a treaty must pass through the federal
government. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Italian administrative court, like the Italian Sen-
ate, believed any federal assurances against the death penalty would be limited by the
autonomy of the individual states. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra,
pt. I, para. 2.4; see also supra note 167 (discussing the Italian Senate motion opposing ex-
tradition). Therefore, it could not meet the requirement of absolute assurance. See id.
181. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl: 2. The Supremacy Clause declares that all laws made
pursuant to the Constitution and all treaties made under the authority of the United States
shall be the "supreme Law of the Land" and supersede any state law or state constitu-
tional provision. See id. It is the position of the U.S. government that international trea-
ties have supremacy over state law. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9. Thus, in the eyes of
U.S. authorities, any federal assurance would be absolute. Cf. id. (noting U.S. government
arguments on how the Supremacy Clause affects the nature of state death penalty stat-
utes).
182. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 5. The court did
not agree with Venezia's argument that he would have insufficient judicial remedies
should the United States break its promise not to impose capital punishment. See id. The
court's view differs from the views expressed by the Italian Senate and the lower adminis-
trative court. See supra note 167 (noting the views of the Italian Senate); supra note 180
and accompanying text (noting the view of the administrative court).
183. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 2.4; id. pt. II, para.
5. Although the court stated that no question existed as to the interpretation of the Su-
premacy Clause, it never concretely expressed what it believed the interpretation to be.
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these divergent views and address whether the assurances were suffi-
cient, the court instead rejected the entire concept of assurances, on the
grounds that providing assurances could not adequately protect the right
to life guaranteed by the Italian Constitution. Once the right to life
exists, the court stated, the principle of sufficient assurances becomes
constitutionally inadmissible when left to the discretion of government
officials.'85 Therefore, because any treaty, law, or regulation must con-
form to the absolute protection of the right to life, the discretionary as-
surances provision within the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty was improper
under Italian law, requiring the invalidation of the provision's imple-
• • .. 186
menting legislation. In order to protect the rights recognized within the
Italian Constitution, the court believed that any assurances given by a
requesting state that imposes the death penalty must be absolute.""
IV. Missing Links: Understanding the Italian Constitutional Court's
Reasoning
After Venezia, U.S. officials expressed concern about the effect of the
Italian Constitutional Court's decision.'9 Questions loomed as to the
See id.
184. See id. The court found the flexibility inherent in delegating the decision of the
adequacy of assurances to the Justice Minister unconstitutional. See id. The discretion left
to the Justice Minister, in the court's view, could not be reconciled with the absolute na-
ture of the right to life as protected by the Italian Constitution. See id.
185. See id. pt. II, para. 5 to 6. The court believed that the right to life, within the
Italian Constitution, could not co-exist with a treaty that infringed upon the absolute guar-
antee of that right. See id. By entrusting the final decision on extradition to the Justice
Minister, the court believed adaptations of policy or political concerns could subordinate
the right to life to other interests. See id.
186. See id. pt. II, paras. 5 to 6. Consequently, Venezia could not be extradited to the
United States for any crime punishable by the death penalty. See Italian Court Bars Ex-
tradition, supra note 44, at A10. However, under Italian law, Venezia may be tried in It-
aly. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 6. Although he may
draw a life sentence under Italian law, the Italian parole and pardon procedures are con-
siderably more relaxed than those in the United States. See Italy Refuses To Extradite
Suspect in Miami Killing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 28, 1996, at A9. Venezia's trial be-
gan in Italy in October 1997, and part of the testimony was taken in Miami in April 1998.
See Karen Shaw, Traveling Justice: Ailing Widow is Allowed to Testify in Miami for Mur-
der Trial of Italian Man, SUN SENTINEL (South Fla.), Apr. 29, 1998, at 3B. Closing argu-
ments for the trial are scheduled to take place in Italy in June 1998. See id.
187. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 5 to 6. Therefore,
the assurance given by the United States, although absolute by the understanding of both
federal and state authorities, does not provide the assurance required by the Italian Con-
stitution. See id. But see infra Part IV.A (arguing that the Italian court ignored an inter-
pretation which would have preserved the treaty and constitutional concerns).
188. See Tagliabue, supra note 163, at 22A. A U.S. Department of Justice spokesman
was quoted as saying, "'I think it serves as a bad omen."' Id. The U.S. Embassy spokes-
man in Rome responded that no comment or challenge to the decision would occur until
1998]
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possible implications of the decision on U.S.-Italian judicial collaboration
efforts. To understand the possible effects of the decision, it is first
necessary to discuss the reasons for the decision in Venezia. Accord-
ingly, several factors may help explain the court's justification for invali-
dating the capital punishment provision of the U.S.-Italy Extradition
Treaty.
A. The Not-So-Sure Assurances Problem
In its ruling, the court provided conflicting views of the U.S. federal
government's power to give assurances that were enforceable against the
state courts of Florida.'9 Initially, the court appeared to accept the ad-
ministrative judge's doubt as to the ability of the federal government to
provide assurances against the imposition of the death penalty in a state
proceeding."' In a later discourse, however, the Italian Constitutional
Court expressed a different belief when it appeared to say that the U.S.
Supremacy Clause would control the enforceability of federal assurances
over the state.9  Instead of resolving the issue, the court declared that
the remedies available under U.S. law were irrelevant.19 Rather, the
relevant concern was the intrinsic insufficiency of both the extradition
treaty and domestic Italian law, which left the judgment of the reliability
the full scope of the decision was understood. See Italian Court Bars Extradition, supra
note 44, at A10.
189. See Italian Court Bars Extradition, supra note 44, at A10. The U.S. Department
of Justice expressed particular concern over the possible effect of the ruling on extradition
proceedings for members of organized crime. See Richard Bashor, Citing Florida's Death
Penalty, Court Rejects Extradition to U.S., CHICAGO TRIB., June 28, 1996, at 8. The 1983
U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty served as the primary tool by which such fugitives were
brought to American courts. See id.
190. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Italian court's
treatment of the assurance issue).
191. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 2.4. This statement
occurs within the discussion of the administrative judge's findings, but the court's opinion
leaves unclear exactly what strength the court attaches to the argument, or if it disagrees
with the statement at all. See id.
192. See id. pt. II, para. 5. This statement appears to refute the earlier statement at-
tributed to the administrative judge. See id. pt. I, para. 2.4. However, the court couched
the language in terms of Venezia's doubts and not the reasoning of the administrativejudge. See id. pt. II, para. 5. Thus, the court rejected Venezia's argument without expla-
nation, but never expressly rejects the statement of the administrative judge. See id. This
leaves unclear the actual belief of the court. See id.
193. See id. This would seem to be the most logical place for the court to address ex-
actly what type of assurances the U.S. federal government is capable of, then compare
those assurances to what is required by the Italian Constitution. The court, however, de-
clined to discuss the issue, instead addressing the discretion left to the Justice Minister of
Italy in extradition decisions. See id.
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of assurances at the discretion of the Justice Minister of Italy. 9' This dis-
cretion, the court believed, could not be reconciled with the absolute na-
ture of Italian constitutional protections.9
The court's reasoning ignored a basic consideration: if the court be-
lieved that the federal government could, upon request, give absolute as-
surances on behalf of the state (Florida), then the alleged unconstitu-
tional discretion given to the Justice Minister would be moot, provided
that such a guarantee was obtained. 96 Therefore, the most obvious way
to protect constitutional concerns and also mitigate damage to the U.S.-
Italy Extradition Treaty would have been to construe the treaty, or per-
haps applicable Italian law, as requiring absolute assurances in death
penalty extradition."'
194. See id. The court seemed to be most troubled by the absence of Italian constitu-
tional standards in extradition decisions, and not by the problem of the sufficiency of U.S.
assurances. See id. pt. II, paras. 4 to 5 (noting the position of the right to life as a constitu-
tional guarantee superceding the extradition treaty).
195. See id. pt. II, para. 4 (stating that the right to life is an "absolute parameter of
evaluation of the Constitutional legitimacy of the general [Italian] law on granting extradi-
tion").
196. Thus, if the Justice Minister requested and received absolute assurances, any ac-
ceptance of those assurances as adequate would not violate the court's constitutional con-
cerns. Cf Bianchi, supra note 40, at 729-30 (noting that the Italy-Morroco Extradition
Treaty allows the requesting state to substitute the Italian penalty in place of the death
penalty in order to obtain extradition); see also Leich, supra note 96, at 746-47 (detailing
the aftermath of the Soering case, where Soering was extradited to the U.S. under a first
degree murder charge instead of capital murder). In Soering, rather than risk an outright
refusal and possibly harm U.S.-U.K. judicial cooperation, the United Kingdom collabo-
rated with U.S. officials to obtain extradition for first-degree murder (which has no possi-
bility of capital punishment) rather than the original request of extradition for capital
murder. See id. In these instances, the courts have let the political branches craft solu-
tions that foster continued cooperation.
The Florida prosecutor in charge of the Venezia case agreed not to seek the death pen-
alty if Venezia was extradited. See Tagliabue, supra note 163, at 22A. The Italian Court
never mentioned the agreement, perhaps because an absolute assurance against capital
punishment was never requested by the Justice Minister. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9
(stating that U.S. Justice Department had made "undertakings" that Venezia would not
face capital punishment).
197. As mentioned, a similar result occurred in the aftermath of the Soering case. See
supra note 96 (discussing the aftermath of the Soering decision). After the European
Court determined that the extradition of Soering for capital murder would violate the
European Convention, the U.K. and U.S. governments agreed to extradite Soering for a
charge of first degree murder, which, in Virginia, was not punishable by the death penalty.
See Leich, supra note 96, at 746-47. In addition, the federal government secured a conces-
sion from Virginia authorities that U.S. law, via the agreement between the two national
governments, prohibited a prosecution for capital murder. See id. Thus, Soering was ex-
tradited for murder, and the "absolute" assurance was obtained through the concession of
Virginia authorities. See id.
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The court's decision to bypass such an interpretation suggests two pos-
sible explanations."' First, the court may not have had unequivocal faith
in the ability of the U.S. federal government to enforce treaty obligations
upon the states through the Supremacy Clausei 9 If true, the court could
have required absolute assurance by suggesting, or mandating, that the
state give absolute assurances to the U.S. federal government prior to
any extradition decision by Italian officials.2°° Such a practice would have
provided the absolute right to life which the court wished to protect,
while leaving the extradition treaty intact.20 ' By ignoring this interpreta-
198. While bypassing such an interpretation, the court mentioned the need for interna-
tional judicial collaboration, and noted the fears that a decision not to extradite would
create a safe-haven in Italy for U.S. death penalty fugitives. See Venezia, June 25, 1996,
n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 3.2. However, the court mentioned these concerns only
in the context of recognizing the Italian Government's arguments to allow extradition, and
never refuted the arguments. See id. These two concerns also were present in the re-
quested state's arguments in the Soering, Kindler, and Ng cases. See Ng, U.N. Doc.
A/49/40 (1994), at 189, 195; Kindler v. Canada, 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 307, 308 (1993); Soering,
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (1989). In each of the cases, the reviewing bodies con-
sidered such arguments to be persuasive factors in its decision. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40
(1994), at 205; Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L. J. at 314 ; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at
35. In contrast, the Italian Constitutional Court expressed no concern over the effect of
invalidating the implementing legislation for the extradition treaty's capital punishment
provision. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 3.2.
199. See Extradition Blocked, supra note 166, at F12 (stating that U.S. assurances were
not enough to permit Venezia's extradition); Graham, supra note 149, at 9 (stating that the
Italian Constitutional Court refused to consider the impact of the Supremacy Clause).
This conclusion does not appear to be consistent with the court's statement about the in-
terpretation of the Supremacy Clause. See supra notes 179-83, 190-93 and accompanying
text (discussing the court's conflicting statements about the power of U.S. federal authori-
ties over state officials). Since the court never develops its statement, however, it is diffi-
cult to ascertain the exact magnitude of the court's faith in the U.S. federal government's
power over the states. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text (analyzing the pos-
sible meanings of the Italian Court's statements). But see supra note 167 (noting that both
the lower administrative court and the Italian Senate expressed doubt as to the federal
government's ability to control state-imposed criminal punishments).
200. Again, this is similar to the aftermath of the Soering decision. See supra note 96
and accompanying text (discussing the Soering aftermath). Therefore, regardless of the
issue of the power of the federal government to enforce its assurances against the state,
the Italian court could have placed the burden of producing absolute assurances upon U.S.
federal officials and simultaneously limited the discretion of the Justice Minister by inter-
preting "sufficient" assurances to require that "sufficient" meant "absolute," as was done
in the aftermath of Soering. Cf. Leich, supra note 96, at 746-47 (stating that Soering was
extradited for a non-capital crime).
201. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the outcome in Soering and
how it protected Soering's right under the European Convention without compromising
the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty). Such an assurance by the state to the federal govern-
ment could theoretically take the form of legislation, a state judicial decision, executive
agreement, or a concession by state authorities, as was the case in the Soering aftermath.
See Leich, supra note 96, at 746-47 (stating that Virginia authorities conceded their inabil-
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tion,'c the court's decision pointed toward the second explanation-
namely that concerns existing beyond the need for reconciliation of the
extradition treaty and the Italian Constitution necessitated the
invalidation of a portion of the extradition treaty.203
B. The Special Nature of the Italian Constitutional Court
To fully understand what those other concerns were, it is important to
examine the second factor in the Italian Constitutional Court's reason-
ing. Like other judicial systems, the Italian courts, including the Consti-
tutional Court, often perform judicial functions that result in judicial
legislation.2 4 Unlike other judicial systems, however, the Italian Consti-
tutional Court often performs quasi-political functions resulting in judi-
cial legislation.205 The Constitutional Court, unique in the Western
world, frequently operates in the gray area between judicial and legisla-
ity to impose the death penalty to the Department of State, which was forwarded by dip-
lomatic note to the United Kingdom).
202. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 5. ("The relevant
point here is not the point regarding the remedies provided for by the foreign laws, but the
intrinsic insufficiency of the mechanism provided for by [the treaty and Italian law] ...
against the constitutional rule [of the right to life].").
203. See id. pt. II, para. 4. Discussing the relevance of the death penalty in Italy, the
court stated that the prohibition of the death penalty, as a punishment "contrary to the
sense of humanity," implies a principle "that in many senses can be considered Italian."
Id. The court noted that the right to life "is the first of the inviolable Rights of Man, rec-
ognized by Article 2 [of the Italian Constitution]." Id. The court therefore placed the
greatest interest in protecting the absolute nature of the right to life, and established the
right as an "absolute guarantee" in the evaluation of extradition treaties and laws. See id.
Rather than interpret the Constitution in a way that preserved both the constitutional
right and the extradition treaty, the court instead subjected the treaty to rigid constitu-
tional examination. See id.
In addition, the court was under substantial political pressure to deny the extradition of
Venezia. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing the political circum-
stances surrounding Venezia). Political sentiment is an important concern in Italian judi-
cial review. See infra notes 204-15 and accompanying text (noting the political sentiment
and how such concerns affect the court and its role in the Italian legal system).
204. See Giuseppe Di Federico, Italy: A Peculiar Case, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION
OF JUDICIAL POWER 233, 233-34 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995). Di
Federico explains the "law explosion" in Italy in which the Italian courts have become the
primary recourse for the definition of citizen rights. See id. at 233. Di Federico notes that
many of these decisions expand beyond the case decided into a legislative role by defining
"who gets what, when, and how." Id. at 234.
205. See Enzo Cheli & Filippo Donati, Methods and Criteria of Judgment on the Ques-
tion of Rights to Freedom in Italy, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 227, 230-31. Cheli
and Donati note that not only does the Constitutional Court enforce the will of the Italian
Constitution against the political majority, but, at times, it also enforces the will of the po-
litical majority against the Constitution through decisions that closely parallel a legislative
power. See id. at 231.
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tive functions.0 6 While the court may consider only issues brought be-
fore it by judges or parties who request constitutional guidance,20 its de-
cisions are not bound by historical judicial restraints.' °8 The judgment ofthe court is often "abstract," meaning that the court will focus on the
206. See id. at 231. The authors note that the court performs both judicial and legisla-
tive functions. See id. Originally, the court was restricted by law from examining political
interests or from usurping legislative functions from the Italian Parliament. See id. at 233.
The measure never met with any significant success and has since become functionally in-
operative. See id.
207. See id. at 230. This limitation carries a lesser significance in Italy because of the
peculiar nature of public prosecution. See Di Federico, supra note 204, at 234. Public
prosecutors, as well as judges, are largely independent from any supervision by the other
branches of government, giving them freedom to construct their own judicial agenda with-
out fear of retaliation. See Carlo Guarnieri, Judicial Independence and Policy-Making in
Italy, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 245-48, 251 (C. Neal Tate &
Torbjorn Vallinder eds. 1995). Both the public prosecutors and judges enjoy the same
status, recruit from the same body of attorneys, and together govern themselves through
the Higher Council of the Judiciary, which is comprised of colleagues elected by the
prosecutors and judges. See id. at 247-48.
208. Cf Cheli & Donati, supra note 205, at 242 (explaining that the court's review of a
case is often more political than judicial and it frequently acts as an innovator of constitu-
tional law). At its conception, the Court had three fundamental objectives: guarantee the
"rigidity" of the Italian Constitution against transient political influence, introduce a
"judge of freedoms" entrusted with the protection of human rights, and adjudicate contro-
versies between governmental bodies. Id. at 228-29. Because of its unique position, the
court often becomes more concerned with abstract principles rather than rigid constitu-
tional rules, leading to a compromise of the first objective by treating constitutional provi-
sions as principles to balance against the interests at stake. See id. at 233-34. Therefore,
the Constitutional Court often "operates predominantly as the moving agent of processes
of innovation and reform" by using its independence from the other branches to develop a
political power. Id. at 242.
Because of its aggressive approach, the court "has made itself the direct interpreter...
of the demands emerging from the social body, but not recognised by the [political] party
system." Id. at 243. But cf Michael Mandel, Legal Politics Italian Style, in THE GLOBAL
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 207, at 261, 267 (stating that "rarely does
constitutional litigation become the symbol of a political movement or cause"). Venezia
would appear to be the exception to that assertion. See Italian Court Bars Extradition, su-
pra note 44, at A10 (stating that Venezia's case became a "rallying point" for anti-death
penalty activists and officials in Italy).
In addition to its political independence, the Constitutional Court, rather than protect
the constitution solely by invalidating laws, uses "pre-emptive strikes" to guide constitu-
tional development. See Cheli & Donati, supra note 205, at 234. For example, the court
often circumvents the requirement that it may only hear questions presented by judges or
interested parties. See id. It does so by "rais[ing] before its own jurisdiction a preliminary
question of constitutionality in relation to the judgment of the other [original] question,"
in effect directing judicial review to areas unforeseen in the original legal question at issue.
See id. Therefore, the court may use the question at hand as a springboard to address a
multitude of related issues. See id. Finally, the court has acquired a broadened power
when invalidating laws. See id. at 235. When a law is found unconstitutional, the court
may decide which other rules also must be declared unconstitutional as a result of the
original judgment. See id.
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limits imposed by the Italian Constitution as well as the desired result of
the law in question.2 9 Additionally, and more importantly, the decision
usually will be based upon constitutional principles rather than rules of
law.1 Controversies are judged not by rules of constitutionality, but
rather in terms of balancing constitutional principles against the interests
at stake.21 Therefore, in carrying out its duties of interpreting and safe-
guarding the Italian Constitution, the court may, in effect, indirectly leg-
islate matters beyond the controversy at hand by establishing and defin-
ing the principles of Italian society, rather than providing strict rules of
law to be obeyed by other governmental bodies. Because of this
unique quality, it becomes highly important to consider the political cir-S • • 211
cumstances surrounding any 2ecision.
209. See Cheli & Donati, supra note 205, at 230. This is very different from the U.S.
Supreme Court, which is limited to adjudicating concrete controversies. See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1, cl. 2. The Italian Constitutional Court's political power and judicial independ-
ence is much greater, allowing it to balance constitutional rules against the interests at
stake in a much broader sense. See Cheli & Donati, supra note 205, at 234. The Constitu-
tional Court treats constitutional rules as principles "aiming at the protection of certain
interests or expressing certain values" instead of rigid rules immune from contraction or
expansion. See id. The combination of the peculiar nature of Italian prosecutors and
judges, when mixed with the scope and nature of Constitutional Court review, makes the
Italian court unique among both common law and civil law nations. See id. at 230-31.
210. See Cheli & Donati, supra note 205, at 233 ("[T]here is a tendency on the part of
Italian constitutional justice not to treat the content of the Italian constitution as absolute
rules, but rather as principles, aiming at the protection of certain interests or expressing
certain values."). Thus, the Italian court becomes a judicial and political legislator, inte-
grating social agendas with constitutional principles. See id. at 243.
211. See id. at 233-34. The Constitutional Court typically engages in two types of bal-
ancing. See id. at 258-59. In the first type, the Constitutional Court may balance the inter-
ests behind legislation. See id. at 258. The balancing acts as a secondary control upon leg-
islative functions, and does not involve application of the court's quasi-political powers.
See id. The second form of balancing is the type in question in Venezia, where the court
balances the interests at stake with constitutional values. See id. at 259; see also In re
Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 4 to 6 (discussing the dual
concerns of "constitutional principles" and "reciprocal judicial assistance" interests). It is
in this type of balancing that the Constitutional Court exercises part of its quasi-political
power by "superimpos[ing] its own evaluation of the interests at stake onto that deter-
mined by the legislator." Cheli & Donati, supra note 205, at 260.
212. See Cheli & Donati, supra note 205, at 233-34, 242-43.
213. See Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic
Courts and the Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 640-41, 657-
58 (1996) (noting that domestic courts are interpreting national constitutions within the
context of international agreements, and that such decisions require consideration of the
surrounding political factors).
An unusual paradox emerges when Venezia is analyzed with a clear recognition of the
Italian Constitutional Court's unique position. If, in fact, the court does rely on principles
rather then rigid constitutional rules, why does the Constitutional Court consistently refer
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The Venezia decision is no exception. The struggle to prevent the ex-
tradition of Venezia created a political maelstrom in Italy, one that Ital-
ian politicians felt could best be calmed by a Constitutional Court judg-
ment. "' Through Venezia, the Constitutional Court was presented with
an opportunity to settle the death penalty issue permanently.215 The
court's independence, prestige, and quasi-political power216 provided the
opportunity for a definitive end to the death penalty controversy, and
also reiterated Italian opposition to capital punishment in the United
States.2 7 The court balanced the law-the extradition treaty with the
United States-against the principle-the right to life. 8 Venezia estab-
lished that the Italian Constitution provides a right to life that may not
be abridged in any fashion.219 Furthermore, the court relied upon the
to the right to life as an absolute rule of Italian law? See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223,
Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 4 to 5. Two possible reasons exist. First, the court is noted
for its strong judicial activism when confronted with rights to freedom, the right to life
being the foremost freedom. See Cheli & Donati, supra note 205, at 243. Second, the
court emphasized in Venezia that the right to life is a principle "that in many senses can be
considered Italian." Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 4. Thus,
while the court sees the right to life as a principle, the balancing undertook in Venezia re-
sults in an absolute rule-that the guarantee of the right to life is an inviolable principle
enforceable against the Italian government and its laws and treaties. Cf id. pt. II, para. 4
(stating that the right to life is enforceable against the exercise of any governmental
power).
214. Cf. Graham, supra note 149, at 9 (noting the heavy involvement of several promi-
nent Italian political figures). Pressure for a constitutional review came from various
members of Italy's political parties. See id.
215. See Tagliabue, supra note 163, at 22A (discussing the shift of public sentiment to-
wards eliminating the death penalty). Any internal backlash over the decision seems un-
likely because many Italians viewed the controversy as a chance to take a stand against
American politics. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9. After the decision, the typical Ital-
ian newspaper headline read, "Court defies U.S." and one politician called the decision an
"honour to Italy." See id.
216. See supra notes 204-15 (discussing the independence and quasi-political power of
the Constitutional Court).
217. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 4 to 6. The court
established the right to life as an absolute parameter limiting the power of the Italian gov-
ernment. See id. Therefore, no abrogation of this right could occur outside of constitu-
tional reform. Cf. id. pt. II, para. 5 (stating that the "prohibition of the death penalty is
constitutionally protected"). For the United States, the decision marked another signal of
international discontent over the conditions of U.S. capital punishment. See Italian Court
Bars Extradition, supra note 44, at A10 (noting the "general European unhappiness" over
U.S. capital punishment); Italy Refuses to Return Murder Suspect, FLA. TODAY, June 28,
1996, at 7B (stating that the ruling "added another prominent voice to the growing Euro-
pean opposition of capital punishment-even at the risk of ignoring international pacts").
218. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 4 to 5. The Court
refers to the right to life as both a constitutional rule and as a constitutional principle.
See id. pt. I, para. 3.2; id. pt. II, paras. 4 to 5; see also supra note 213 (discussing the possi-
ble reasons for the contradiction).
219. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 4. The court first
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presumption that Italian society values this right above international ob-
ligations.2 '0 This allowed Italy to take a more prominent stance regarding
human rights and simultaneously assert itself against American politics.
2 1
Instead of a creative interpretation or expressing the need for reform
22
the Court appeared to send a message to America: perhaps it is time to
re-examine the need for the death penalty in the age of human rights. 23
C. The Contributions of the European Court and the UNHRC
The Italian Constitutional Court made its decision in the wake of deci-r 224
sions such as Soering, Kindler, and Ng. Although the court did not
stated that the absolute guarantee of the right to life influences the exercise of the powers
of every part of the Italian government. See id. The Constitutional Court then established
the right to life as an "absolute parameter" when evaluating extradition laws. See id
220. See pt. II, paras. 4 to 5. The Court recognized the "old, and well established prin-
ciple pacta sunt servanda"-obligations must be kept. Id. pt. I, para. 3.2. It also realized
that non-cooperation in international criminal matters may result in the requested state
becoming a safe haven for international fugitives. See id. This possibility was a chief con-
cern of both the European Court and the UNHRC in their earlier decisions. See supra
note 198 (discussing the European Court's and UNHRC's recognition of the need for in-
ternational judicial cooperation and preventing the creation of safe-havens for fugitives).
However, the Italian court made only a brief mention of these concerns. See Venezia,
June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. I, para. 3.2. Instead, it focused upon the fact that
the discretion given to the Minister of Justice in obtaining assurances and the nature of
those assurances as defined by the treaty provision were unconstitutional. See id. pt. II,
para. 5.
221. See Graham, supra note 149, at 9 (quoting one politician as saying "[t]his sentence
reiterates without a shadow of doubt the principle that our judicial system completely re-
jects the death penalty"). Rejecting American politics was perhaps not the intention of
the Constitutional Court, although such a result was precisely what many Italian politi-
cians hoped to accomplish. Cf. Extradition Blocked, supra note 166, at F12 (noting an
Italian politician's statement that the decision was a victory over American politics).
222. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text (arguing that the court ignored an
interpretation which would protect the right to life and leave the extradition treaty intact).
223. Cf. Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 4. (stating that the
death penalty is a punishment "contrary to the sense of humanity"). Italian politicians
who had campaigned for the court to hear Venezia's case celebrated the decision as a blow
against the United States and its support for the death penalty. See Graham, supra note
149, at 9 (quoting one politician who praised the decision as "historic"); Extradition
Blocked, supra note 166, at F12 (noting that the decision received broad acceptance by
members across the political spectrum).
224. See supra Part II (explaining the Soering, Kindler, and Ng decisions and their im-
pact on extradition law). The Italian Constitution explicitly recognizes the importance of
international law and values in interpreting its constitution. See COST. [Constitution] art.
10 (Italy); see also Francioni, supra note 132, at 19 (noting that the Italian Constitution is
influenced by a "'international' model represented by a system open to the values of the
international society and subject to the primacy of international law"). When enforcing
human rights, however, Italians tend to view them from the perspective of domestic rules.
See id. at 60 ("[W]hen Italian courts protect human rights, they are inclined to understand
the latter in light of domestic rules rather than international ones." (emphasis added)).
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mention any of these decisions, it is unlikely that Venezia was decided in
a vacuum.2" As a member of the European Convention and the ICCPR,
Italy must look to Soering as a guiding principle, and to Kindler and Ng
as providing further instruction.12 6 The ultimate result of those decisions
was to advance human rights by freeing the judicial branch from the rule
of non-inquiry,2" limiting extradition as a foreign policy tool,226 and as-
Before the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, Venezia had submitted his case
for review by the European Commission on Human Rights. See Bianchi, supra note 40, at
730. The European Commission asked that Venezia not be extradited until it had exam-
ined Venezia's application. See id. This delay allowed Venezia to bring his case before
the administrative court and Italian Constitutional Court, and the Commission dismissed
the application after the Constitutional Court reported its decision. See id.
225. See Rogoff, supra note 213, at 636-41, 657-59 (discussing how national courts as-
sist in the development of international law); see also supra note 224 (explaining how Ital-
ian courts prefer to enforce international values through domestic rules). Rogoff notes
that domestic courts often look to international standards when interpreting constitutional
provisions. See Rogoff, supra note 213, at 640. He explains that in such cases it is impor-
tant to consider political factors that may affect how a domestic court chooses to interpret
an international agreement. See id. at 657. Using this logic, Italy's decision in Venezia was
affected by two central issues-existing international human rights jurisprudence, via the
UNHRC and European Court, and the political forces at work within Italy at the time of
the court's decision. See id. at 640, 657; Graham, supra note 149, at 9 (describing the exis-
tence of a "vocal anti-extradition campaign" concerning Venezia).
226. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 35 (1989) ("It is normally for the [Euro-
pean] Convention institutions ... [to determine] potential violations of the Convention.
However,... a departure from this principle is necessary, in view of the serious and irrepa-
rable nature [of the risk of the fugitive suffering inhuman or degrading treatment] ...
[and] to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguard."); Roecks, supra note 29, at 205, 215-16
(noting that Soering provided a fugitive with substantive and procedural rights, and Kin-
dler and Ng required requested states to inquire into the human rights conditions of the
requesting state). The decision in Soering has been respected by all members of the Euro-
pean Convention, including Italy. See Breitenmoser & Wilms, supra note 71, at 873. The
Constitutional Court also must look to the Kindler and Ng cases as guides for interpreta-
tion of international standards, thereby incorporating the international law principles es-
tablished by those cases into domestic law. See Quigley, supra note 55, at 1224-25 (stating
that the UNHRC requires domestic courts of member states to enforce the obligations of
the ICCPR).
227. See supra Part II.C (discussing how the Soering, Kindler, and Ng provided a legal
foundation for abandoning the rule of non-inquiry).
228. See Shea, supra note 9, at 111 (noting that Soering justified granting less defer-
ence to a head of state in extradition proceedings). By incorporating international human
rights standards into extradition law, the decisions of the European Court and the
UNHRC have established judicial review on an international level, thus preventing mem-
ber states from making arbitrary or summary extradition decisions. See Ng v. Canada,
Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 189, 205 (stating that "[t]he Committee notes that the extra-
dition of Mr. Ng would have violated [the ICCPR] if the decision to extradite without as-
surances had been taken summarily or arbitrarily"). Thus, extradition decisions must con-
form to a more uniform standard and must not be used by heads of state to curry favor or
provide political retaliation. Cf. Shea, supra note 9, at 86-87, 110 (discussing how Soering
has altered the role of the judiciary in extradition proceedings and allowed courts to aban-
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serting the supremacy of international conventions over extradition
law.229
Venezia represented perhaps the next step in the integration of inter-
national human rights with traditional extradition law. The Venezia de-
cision did not subordinate extradition treaties to international conven-
tions, but rather to judicial interpretation according to the requested
state's constitutional laws and principles.230  The key difference in
Venezia was that, rather than examining the judicial and penal conditions
within the requesting state and weighing the relevant personal factors
such as the age or mental state of the fugitive, the Constitutional Court
advanced what could be termed the rule of "anti-inquiry. '' Instead of
refusing to inquire into conditions within the requesting state because it
invades national sovereignty, exceeds the scope of permissible powers, 32
don the traditional deference afforded to heads of state).
229. See Donnelly, supra note 74, at 347 (stating that Soering imposed the standards of
the European Convention upon a member state's extradition treaties with non-member
states); Roecks, supra note 29, at 215-16 (noting that Kindler and Ng obligate member
states of the ICCPR to assess the conditions in the requesting state according to ICCPR
standards).
230. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 5; see also Bianchi,
supra note 40, at 732 (noting that "[b]y avoiding the international law issues in the case,
the Constitutional Court also avoided addressing whether, and, if so, when, the principles
and values enshrined in national constitutions are to prevail over international law in case
of conflicting requirements"). Thus, the Constitutional Court, in effect, "exports" its own
human rights law into the United States by denying extradition of fugitives subject to the
death penalty. Cf. Lillich, supra note 53, at 712-13 (noting that the "cross-fertilization" of
international and national court decisions in human rights jurisprudence has allowed na-
tional courts to "participate in the progressive development of human rights law on the
international plane").
231. The term "anti-inquiry" is a creation of the author used in an attempt to provide
a normative label for the inquiry advanced by the Venezia court. The rule of non-inquiry
stands for the proposition that courts will not inquire into the judicial systems of request-
ing states. See Quigley, supra note 6, at 403. In comparison, a rule of "anti-inquiry" in-
stead would stand for the proposition that the court would refuse to review judicial and
penal conditions within a requesting state because, empirically, the law in the requesting
state clearly contradicts the law within the requested state. Cf Venezia, June 25, 1996,
n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 4 (discussing the contradiction between the right to life
within the Italian Constitution and the concept of capital punishment). Thus, any action
taken with regard to an extradition request by a requesting state imposing the death pen-
alty would be based upon the court's reading of its own domestic law because it is viewed
as in direct conflict with the requested state's laws to a degree that moots any further in-
quiry. Cf id. pt. II, para. 6 (deciding that the conflict between the Italian Constitution and
the extradition treaty demands the invalidation of the capital punishment provision's im-
plementing legislation). In Venezia, the real underlying struggle involved the Italian right
to life against the American "right" to capital punishment, two principles which were, in
the court's opinion, irreconcilable. Cf. id. pt. II, para. 4 (noting that the right to life is an
Italian principle, and calling capital punishment "contrary to the sense of humanity").
232. See Shea, supra note 9, at 93 (noting that such an inquiry traditionally was part of
the foreign affairs power, an arena historically left to the discretion of heads of state). The
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or because of a presumption of compliance with human rights stan-
dards,23' the Italian court decided that because of the existing treaty lan-
guage, it simply cannot inquire into the internal conditions of the re-
questing state.23 The court reasoned that internal considerations of the
requested state-here, Italian constitutional law-oppose extradition re-
gardless of the sufficiency of the requesting state's assurances against im-
position of the death penalty or the sufficiency of its judicial and penal
systems. 35
V. THE "SOVEREIGN" CHOICE: POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF VENEZIA
An examination of human rights advances over the past few decades
reveals a general progression in limiting national sovereignty over death
penalty extradition decisions through more assertive human rights
agreements and quasi-judicial decisions.236 Initially, countries signed hu-
man rights agreements that imposed little direct control over national
theory is often based upon the idea that adjudication of these issues would intrude upon
foreign affairs, and that courts could not properly consider diplomatic concerns. See id.;
Semmelman, supra note 10, at 1229-30 (arguing that, in the United States, the Secretary of
State is in a better position to deal with the foreign concerns presented by an extradition
request).
233. See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 116, 120-21 (stating that often courts will not evalu-
ate the judicial conditions in the requesting state because the existence of an extradition
treaty proves that a political decision about the sufficiency of such conditions has already
been made).
234. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 5 (explaining that
"[tihe relevant point here is not the point regarding the remedies provided for by the for-
eign laws, but the intrinsic insufficiency of... the [extradition] treaty ... [when examined]
against [the right to life]").
235. See id., pt. II, paras. 3.1 to 6.
236. For example, the Universal Declaration, first signed in 1948, contained no af-
firmative obligations. See Universal Declaration, supra note 7; John Quigley, The Interna-
tional Covenant On Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1287, 1288 (1993). The ICCPR, which was based upon the rights in the Universal
Declaration, was adopted in 1966 and contained binding obligations for signatory states.
See id. However, the ICCPR did not enter into force until 1976, mainly because of lengthy
delays in obtaining the necessary number of national ratifications. See id. The European
Convention was signed in 1950, but it did not require member states to abolish the death
penalty until 1983. See European Convention, supra note 6, at 222; Protocol No. 6, supra
note 52, at 538. Each of these agreements, along with a variety of other instruments, have
contributed to the growing abolition of the death penalty. See SCHABAS, supra note 27, at
295-309 (discussing the factors that have contributed to the growing trend of world-wide
abolition of the death penalty). That, in turn, has limited the requested state's ability to
freely extradite death penalty fugitives to other countries without regard for the fugitive's
rights once within the requesting state. See GILBERT, supra note 1, at 83-88 (discussing
the European Convention and the limitations it has placed upon death penalty extradi-
tion).
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sovereignty.27  As human rights recognition developed, quasi-judicial
bodies created by human rights agreements gradually pushed nations
into conformity by establishing international standards for extradition.238
Finally, with the new international standards providing a strong founda-
tion, the Italian Constitutional Court moved to police international hu-
man rights within its own national courts.239 This decision limited the dis-
cretion of the Justice Minister of Italy to use extradition as a foreign
policy tool, and put additional pressure upon the United States to con-
form to international human rights standards. 4' Ultimately, under
Venezia, the sovereign nation either must join the ranks of abolitionist
nations or face constant obstacles when trying to extradite for capital of-
fenses.241
237. See Quigley, supra note 236, at 1288 (noting that the Universal Declaration con-
tained no obligations enforceable against member states); see also Breitenmoser & Wilms,
supra note 71, at 879-81 (stating that the traditional theory of extradition law was based
upon a relationship between two nations that was independent of any consideration of in-
dividual rights, and was "basically aimed at the protection of the sovereign power of the
requested State").
238. See supra Part II.C (discussing the new international standards for extradition
proceedings created by the decisions of the European Court and the UNHRC).
239. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, paras. 3.1 to 6; see also
Francioni, supra note 132, at 15-16 (discussing the responsibilities of national courts in ad-
dressing human rights); Lillich, supra note 53, at 711-13 (noting the increasing role of na-
tional courts in international human rights jurisprudence); Quigley, supra note 55, at 1226-
29 (discussing the actions of several national courts in policing human rights during extra-
dition proceedings).
240. See Venezia, June 25, 1996, n.223, Appendix, infra, pt. II, para. 5. In any future
treaty negotiations, the discretion left to Italian government officials will be severely
curbed, and the United States will face pressure to provide more affirmative guarantees
that it will not impose the death penalty. See supra note 230 (arguing that the Italian deci-
sion "exports" Italy's human rights standards to the United States).
241. See Bassiouni, supra note 51, at 240-42. Bassiouni notes that "[h]istorically, the
notion of sovereignty has been a bar to the application of international substantive legal
norms to national criminal justice processes" but that "[i]nternational human rights law...
has ... influenced the erosion of national sovereignty with respect to practices within the
context of the administration of criminal justice." Id. at 240-41. Thus, the Italian decision,
as a contribution to the development of international human rights law and extradition
law, erodes the sovereignty of other nations by moving the pendulum closer to a interna-
tional rejection of the death penalty and constructing obstacles for nations who continue
its use. Cf. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 25 (stating that "[d]eath penalty ju-
risprudence [by domestic courts] provides one of the most dramatic examples of this syn-
ergy between international and domestic human rights law").
Italy did not stop with its decision in Venezia. On April 3, 1997, at the urging of the
Italian Government, the UNHRC adopted a resolution on the abolition of the death pen-
alty. See Death Penalty News, March 1997 (visited Apr. 5,1998) <http://www.amnesty.org/
ailib/intcam/dp/dpnmar97.html>. The resolution, which passed by a 27-11 vote with 14
abstentions, asks member states to place a moratorium on executions and elevates the
death penalty issue to a matter of international concern over human rights. See id. The
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A. Short- Term Effect: "Oh give me a home, where there's terrorists in
Rome"
In the immediate future, Venezia's impact will most likely be contained
within Italy. 2 Venezia's final result is that Italy may no longer extradite
fugitives to any country that imposes the death penalty absent a treaty
guaranteeing absolute assurance against capital punishment.243 There-
fore, Italy runs a high risk of becoming a short-term haven for those
wishing to escape American justice.2"
Primary among those wishing to escape capital punishment will be ter-
rorists and members of organized crime. 245 The chief purpose of the 1983
U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty was to simplify proceedings for the ex-
change of members of the Italian Mafia.246 Since the treaty was signed,
resolution requires the Secretary General of the U.N. to prepare an annual report on the
death penalty. See id. On April 3, 1998, Italy again supported a similar UNHRC resolu-
tion, which was co-sponsored by 63 nations and passed by a 26-13 vote with 12 abstentions.
See Hands Off Cain: News of the Week (last visited Apr. 5, 1998) <http://handsoffcain.org/
english/home.html>. The action by the UNHRC is unquestionable evidence of the grow-
ing abolitionist nature of world politics, and shows a desire to promote human rights over
traditional notions of state sovereignty. See id.
242. The unique nature of the Italian Constitutional Court, as well as the complex po-
litical climate in Italy, make it likely that few nations will follow the Venezia decision in
the near future. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Constitu-
tional Court's unique position as well as the political circumstances surrounding the
Venezia decision).
243. See Bianchi, supra note 40, at 733 (stating that after Venezia, "the extradition of
fugitives charged with crimes punishable by death in the United States has been ruled out
under Italian constitutional law, at least pursuant to the existing Extradition Treaty");
Tagliabue, supra note 163 (noting that the court declared the capital punishment provision
in the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty unconstitutional, and put future cooperation between
the United States and Italy in doubt).
244. Cf Martin Dyckman, Labor Might Look to the Children, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, July 2, 1996, at 7A (calling the decision a "dangerous outrage" that prevents extra-
dition from Italy for capital offenses). The safe-haven fear was argued vehemently by the
United Kingdom in the Soering case, and Canada in the Kindler and Ng cases. See Ng v.
Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 189, 195; Kindler v. Canada, Communication No.
470/1991, views adopted on July 30, 1993, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307, 308 (1993); Soering, 161
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1989). The validity of the argument was recognized by both
the European Court and the UNHRC. See Ng, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 205; Kindler,
14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 308; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35.
245. See Italian Court Bars Extradition, supra note 44, at A10 (stating that many al-
leged Mafia members were extradited under the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty's capital
punishment provision); Dyckman, supra note 244, at 7A (suggesting that the inability to
extradite death penalty fugitives would make Italy an attractive home for international
terrorists).
246. Cf. Italian Court Bars Extradition, supra note 44, at A10 (noting that many Mafia
members were extradited under the treaty). For a complete discussion of the U.S.-Italy
Extradition Treaty, see Paolo Mengozzi, A View From Italy on Judicial Cooperation Be-
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many members of the Mafia have been extradited upon assurances that
the United States would not seek the death penalty.211 Without the capi-
tal punishment provision, the United States will have difficulty in con-
tinuing its fight against Mafia members and organized crime.248
In addition, international terrorists could find Italy to be an ideal ha-
ven from American authorities.2 49 Although Venezia involved an Italian
national, in a prior case the court established that "citizen," within the
meaning of Italian Constitution, covers both Italian nationals and for-
eigners when applying constitutional protections.250 Without a capital
punishment provision, the United States could be powerless in recover-
ing terrorists from Italy through diplomatic channels.
21
B. Long-Term Effect: The Death Penalty No Longer a Capital Idea
The unique nature of the Italian Constitutional Court makes it difficult
to predict the long-term impact of the Venezia decision.2  Although the
decision represents a change in the landscape of extradition law, it re-
mains to be seen how other nations will navigate the new territory. 3
tween Italy and the United States: The 1982 Mutual Assistance Treaty and the 1983 Extradi-
tion Treaty, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813, 813 (1986) (noting that the 1983 U.S.-Italy
Extradition Treaty "substantially furthered the cooperative process" on criminal matters).
247. See Italy Refuses to Return Murder Suspect, supra note 175, at 2 (noting that many
fugitives, including alleged Mafia figures, were extradited from Italy with assurances that
U.S. authorities would not seek capital punishment).
248. See Bashor, supra note 189, at 8 (describing the concerns of the U.S. Department
of Justice over the effect of Venezia on future criminal assistance between the United
States and Italy). The United States may not surrender or receive extradition of a fugitive
in the absence of a treaty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994); see also BASSIOUNI, LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 6; Quigley, supra note 55, at 1213 (discussing extradition be-
tween the U.S. and other nations).
249. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of Venezia
protecting international terrorists from extradition to the United States).
250. See In Re Cuillier, Ciamborrani, and Vallon, reprinted in 78 INT'L L. REP. 93, 98-
100 (1988) (holding, in a 1979 decision, that principles of equality within the Italian Consti-
tution require that both citizens and foreigners be given the same constitutional protec-
tions in extradition proceedings). This case originally appeared in Italian. See In Re Cul-
lier, Ciamborrani, and Vallon, June 21, 1979, n.54, Giur. Cost. 1979, 413.
251. See supra notes 1 and 248 (stating that extradition to the United States may not
take place in the absence of a treaty); see also Dyckman, supra note 244, at 7A (arguing
that Venezia will make Italy an attractive home for international terrorists).
252. Since few nations employ such a politically involved court, it is difficult to predict
what type of case would allow for a national court outside of Italy to apply the Venezia
rationale. See supra notes 164-74, 204-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Constitu-
tional Court and the politics of the Venezia case); supra notes 242-51 (arguing probable
short-term effects).
253. See Lillich, supra note 53, at 700-03 (discussing how national courts have applied
international human rights law). Lillich notes that many of the constitutions of the former
British colonies (mostly in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Pacific) are based upon
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One thing is certain-as capital punishment continues to decline
throughout the world, the appeal of the Italian approach should grow.254
Historically, before the Venezia decision, the general trend of human
rights courts was to increase the judicial role in examining the conditions
of the requesting state. Once the number of abolitionist countries sig-
nificantly outnumbers the retentionist countries, however, such a de-
tailed proceeding will seem almost counterproductive because the prohi-
bition on capital punishment may have become part of customary
256international law. National courts within the requested state may move
towards the reasoning employed in Venezia and refuse extradition of a
death penalty fugitive based upon conflicts between the extradition
treaty and constitutional law, international norms, or human rights obli-
gations of the requested state. 7 At that point, the United States will find
itself with a choice: either keep the death penalty at the expense of losing
extradition for capital offenses, or join the ranks of abolitionist nations.25 '
the rights contained in the Universal Declaration and the European Convention. See id.
Therefore, many of their national courts "began applying international human rights law
indirectly when construing constitutional standards." Id. at 700. This is closely akin to
what occurred in the Venezia case, indicating that perhaps Venezia is not as isolated as it
may initially appear. See discussion supra Part III.D (explaining Venezia and possible rea-
sons for the Constitutional Court's decision). Lillich suggests, however, that while such a
result may be a worthy progression, problems with inconsistent interpretation by interna-
tional decision makers may hinder the ultimate integration of national and international
jurisprudence with human rights law. See Lillich, supra note 53, at 701.
254. Cf Bassiouni, supra note 51, at 249 ("[W]hen a significant number of states repre-
senting the major legal systems of the world have adhered to a given convention, it may
become part of customary international law and. .. principles which have become univer-
sally accepted may also rise to the level of peremptory norms of international law.");
Rosen & Journey, supra note 30, at 163-64 (noting that the increased global rejection of
the death penalty is leading towards a change in international law). Thus, as more and
more states reject capital punishment, prohibition of the death penalty may become cus-
tomary international human rights law, allowing for the indirect application of interna-
tional human rights law in the interpretation of constitutional standards. Cf Bassiouni,
supra note 51 at 243-44, 249 (discussing the methods by which domestic law may transform
into international law). Therefore, the underlying principles of Venezia could gain global
acceptance.
255. See supra Part IJ.C (discussing the impacts of Soering, Kindler, and Ng).
256. See supra note 254 and accompanying text (explaining the end result of a situa-
tion where the number of abolitionist nations outnumber retentionist nations). Ulti-
mately, the examination of judicial conditions inside the requesting state will become
moot because the prohibition of capital punishment will have become part of customary
international law. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of
"anti-inquiry").
257. Such a result would parallel Lillich's concept of "'the internationalization of do-
mestic adjudication and ... the manner in which international law increasingly penetrates
and transforms national law."' Lillich, supra note 53, at 713 (quoting Judge Buergenthal).
258. Perhaps a harsh statement, but consider that three major decisions within the last
seven years, Soering, Ng, and Venezia, have held extradition to the United States to be
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VI. CONCLUSION
The landscape of extradition law has changed with the Italian Consti-
tutional Court's decision in Venezia. Unlike the decisions of the Euro-
pean Court and the UNHRC, the impact of the decision cannot be sur-
mised easily. Venezia could gain widespread acceptance and become an
important guide for future extradition controversies involving capital
punishment, or it could become a judicial aberration that treads too far
for other courts to follow. Whatever result occurs, it will not occur in a
vacuum. As the death penalty issue becomes more and more bipolar,
and international standards provide increased protection for human
rights, the reasoning of Venezia may become more appealing. The enig-
matic interaction between state sovereignty, human rights, and extradi-
tion law may soon crystallize into a new age where sovereign nations re-
taining the death penalty find themselves at the mercy of national courts
once satisfied to remain uninvolved in the extradition process, but now
acting as vanguards for international human rights. If this occurs, coun-
tries that continue to use the death penalty, including the United States,
must either reconsider its practical importance, or watch the "long arm of
justice" become considerably shorter.
impermissible because of capital punishment. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.2, III (discussing
Soering, Ng, and Venezia). With such a poor track record in recent years, and in light of
the fact that many bilateral U.S. extradition treaties use language nearly identical to the
that in the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, future attempts to gain extradition of death pen-
alty fugitives will most likely result in continued controversy. See supra notes 45-50 and
accompanying text (discussing the typical U.S. extradition treaty and how it conflicts with
human rights law).
Some evidence suggests that U.S. states which use the death penalty are seeing a decline
in its popularity with juries. See Peter Finn, Given Choice, Va. Juries Vote for Life, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 1997, at Al (stating that death sentences have dropped recently in four
states-Virginia, Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland-because jurors are given the option to
sentence criminals to life without parole). Opponents of the death penalty point out that
when alternative sentences are offered, public support for the death penalty drops below
50%. See Death Penalty Information Center: Public Opinion (last visited Apr. 5, 1998)
<http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpic7.html>.
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THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
Sentence No. 223-1996
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Consisting of: Dr. Mauro FERRI, Attorney, President; Prof. Luigi MENGONI;
Prof. Enzo CHELI; Dr. Renato GRANATA; Prof. Giuliano VASSALLI; Prof.
Francesco GIUZZI; Prof. Cesare MIRABELLI; Prof. Fernando
SANTOSUOSSO; Dr. Massimo VARI, Attorney; Dr. Cesare RUPERTO; Dr.
Riccardo CHIEPPA; Prof. Gustavo ZAGREBELSKY; Prof. Valerio ONIDA;
Prof. Carlo MEZZANOTE, Judges.
Has pronounced the following:
SENTENCE
In the case of the legitimacy of Article 698, paragraph 2, of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, and of Law May 26, 1984, No. 225 (Ratification, and
Execution of the Extradition Treaty between the Republic of Italy, and
the United States of America, signed in Rome on October 13, 1983), for
that portion which concerns execution of Article IX of said Treaty, in the
case initiated with ordinance issued on March 20, 1996 by the Regional
Administrative Court for the Region of Lazio concerning the appeal
submitted by Pietro Venezia against the Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia
(Justice Department), filed with the number 404 in the Ordinance Regis-
try for 1996, and published in Gazzetta Ufficiale of the Republic No. 16,
First Special Series, for 1996.
Having seen the entry of appearance in legal proceedings of Pietro
Venezia, and of the Government of the United States of America, and
the Intervention Act of the President of the Cabinet of Ministers (Presi-
dente del Consiglio dei Ministri);
Having heard the Relating Judge Francesco Guizzi at the Hearing of
May 28, 1996;
Having heard the attorneys, Mario Salerni for Pietro Venezia, Gui-
seppe Frigo, and Giorgio Luceri for the Government of the United
States of America, and the State Attorney, Carlo Salimei, for the Presi-
dent of the Cabinet of Ministers.
PART I: AFTER ASCERTAINING THE FACTS
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1. Against the Decree of The Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia of De-
cember 14, 1995, with which the extradition of the Italian citizen Pietro
Venezia was granted to the Government of United States - Pietro
Venezia was the object of a restrictive measure issued on December 30,
1993 by the Judge for Dade County (Florida) with the charge of first de-
gree homicide - the person who is the object of the extradition presented
an appeal to the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio, with the pur-
pose of obtaining the annulment, after obtaining the suspension, of the
above mentioned decree.
As a reason for this action, the appealing party argued the illegitimacy
of the Ministerial Decree, saying that Article 698, paragraph 2 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, and Law May 26, 1984, No. 225 (Ratifica-
tion, and Execution of Extradition Treaty between the Republic of Italy,
and the United States of America, signed in Rome on October 13, 1983),
are in violation of the Constitution, with regard to that portion which
concerns the execution of Article IX of said Treaty.
2. After rejecting the exceptions relating to lack of jurisdiction which
had been proposed by the Office of State Attorney, the Court temporar-
ily suspended the Ministerial Decree which is the object of the appeal,
and at the same time initiated the case for constitutional legitimacy of
Article 698, paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, - in connec-
tion with Articles 2, 3, 11, and 27, fourth paragraph of the Constitution -
and of Law No. 225 of 1984, with regard to that portion which concerns
the execution of Article IX of said Treaty.
2.1. The Bench observes that the appealed Decree is not to be consid-
ered a political act, and therefore it is submitted to the judgment of the
Administrative Judge. It would lead to the conclusion of two complete
separate procedural phrases, even though they might be connected be-
cause one presupposes the other, and there is no doubt that the Adminis-
trative Authority could perform its own activity of evaluation. In this
manner, the Administrative Jurisdiction would be included in the final
decision, even though it might not be extended to the review of the con-
ditions necessary to sustain the request for extradition which have been
ascertained by the first degree Judge pursuant to Article 704 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. With the same kind of autonomy, the Adminis-
trative Judge could decide on the objections related to the legitimacy of
the laws on which the exercise of the Ministry's power is based, since the
verification of the preliminary assumption of legitimacy of the adminis-
trative act, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 24, and 113 of the Con-
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stitution, is part of his responsibility.
2.2. With regard to the specific motivation concerning the relevance,
the Administrative Court for Lazio recalls the jurisprudence of the Con-
stitutional Court regarding the admissibility of the objections raised by
the Judge (transmitting the case) who temporarily suspended the ap-
pealed act until the resubmission to the Court following the judgment re-
ferring to its constitutionality (Ref. Sentence No. 440 of 1990, and Ordi-
nance No. 24 of 1995). Therefore, the question would be pertinent in
relation to the precautionary request for suspension of the appealed de-
cree, which would seem - prima facie - to be lacking reasons for non-
validity because of excess of power and errors of procedure, because it is
properly motivated with regard to the reliability of the guarantees pro-
vided by the United States Government that capital punishment would
not be inflicted upon the person who is the object of extradition, and, in
any case, it would not be executed.
Such a decision is obviously illegitimate because it was taken on the
basis of laws that were considered unconstitutional. The possibility of
extraditing an Italian citizen so that he can be subjected by the request-
ing Country to criminal proceedings for a crime punishable with the
death penalty - even though subordinated to conditions, or sufficient
guarantees related to the non-application, or non-execution of such a
penalty - would conflict with the fundamental principles of the Constitu-
tion, independently from the kind of guarantees that might be provided.
From this point is derived the evident lack of justification of the ques-
tion.
2.3. First of all, according the transmitting Judge, Article 2 of the Con-
stitution, which recognizes and guarantees the inviolability of human
rights, must be emphasized; among these is the right to life, which is ab-
solute, as laid out in the Sentence of this Court, No. 54 of 1979. At the
same time, it must be remembered that with this specific reference to Ar-
ticle 11 - granting of the extradition sub condicione - the Italian Gov-
ernment presented a reservation to the European Convention of Extra-
dition, ratified with Law January 30, 1963, No. 300, with the commitment
to refuse the extradition for crimes punishable with capital punishment in
the requesting Country.
2.4. There could also be a violation of Article 27 of the Constitution
because of the risk of different subjective evaluations, in different his-
torical-political climates, because the denounced clause entrusts to the
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discretional evaluation of the Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia - according
to non-defined criteria - the judgment on the guarantees of the request-
ing Country, which might not give that certainty imposed by the afore-
mentioned constitutional parameters, since the guarantee will be based
only on the power of the Government entity giving such guarantee to en-
force its application. And in this respect Article VI of the United States
Constitution is of no assistance, because the Treaty lacks an effective
protection since the Federal Government is not bound to particular
forms or types of guarantees, which in any case will be limited by the
autonomy of the individual States.
The a quo Judge quotes Article 3, which concerns the principle of
equality that would be violated for the different attitude of the Italian
Government in signing conventions with other Countries - recently with
Romania, Hungary, and Morocco - which established a direct limit for
the Judge of the requesting Country not to inflict, or not to execute the
death penalty. And lastly he objects to the contrast with Article 11 of the
Constitution, emphasizing that the article admits "limitations to sover-
eignty" only if, and when "necessary to institutions that guarantee peace
and justice among the Nations."
3. The President of the Cabinet of Ministers intervened, as repre-
sented and defended by the State Attorney, arguing for inadmissibility,
or at least the lacks of grounds of the Appeal.
3.1. The appeal would be inadmissible because the control over the le-
gitimacy of the administrative act granting the extradition is limited to
the Government decision, and cannot be expanded to the jurisdictional
case discussed before the Court of Appeal having territorial jurisdiction,
and later, in front of the Supreme Court during the appeal concerning
the substance of the case. The two decisions could not overlap, since the
judicial authority is empowered to examine the requirements provided
for by the law and by the international convention, and because the
Ministry is empowered to evaluate, on the basis of considerations which
are also of a political nature (even contingent) on the status of the dip-
lomatic relations with the requesting Country, whether to grant the ex-
tradition or not. The relationship between the two phases, jurisdictional,
and political-administrative, is clearly provided for by Article 701 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Regional Administrative Court for Lazio could not expand its
control to include the decision regarding the rights of the person to be
extradited, already evaluated by the judicial authority: It could only limit
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itself to judge the legitimate interests alleged by this person with regard
to the safeguard of the correct procedure, and with regard to the legiti-
macy of the political evaluations made by the Ministry; moreover, the ju-
dicial authority could not know the objections to the laws which are at
the basis of the appealed decision. In the opinion of the State Attorney,
only those laws which grant the Ministry discretional power could be
placed in doubt, while the transmitting Judges raised for discussion the
extradition action, recalling the subjective rights of the person to be ex-
tradited, among them the right to life, which have already been examined
by the principal judge.
3.2. With regard to the substance, the case would be without justifica-
tion in any case, and, according to the Sentence No. 54 of 1979 of this
Court, would not be relevant: The law invoked on that occasion con-
sented to the extradition without any limitations or guarantees, even for
crimes punishable with death penalty, whereas the law at the basis of this
appeal assumes guarantees that the death penalty would not be applied,
or executed, if the request for the extradition were to be granted. Also
the reference to the reservation objected to by Italy to the European
Convention on Extradition would not be relevant, because that Treaty
was signed before the one with the United States.
The law in dispute connects the extradition act to the existence of cer-
tain objective and binding parameters - that, in the opinion of the Su-
preme Court - are to be found in the commitment of the United States
Federal Government with the peculiar characteristics of international
obligation, rendered effective and mandatory for the Federal Govern-
ment by Article VI of the Constitution of 1787. On the other hand, a
similar situation exists in our laws, in the case extradition is obtained
only for certain crimes: In this case, Article 720 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure binds the Judicial Authority to the conditions imposed by the
extraditing Country which are freely accepted. Therefore, the interna-
tional obligation is included in a law of our Country, while according to
the institutions of the United States, the compliance with this interna-
tional obligation would be assured - because of the Federal structure -
directly by a Constitutional Law. In this particular case the Supreme
Court points out - "the capital punishment must be considered as non-
existing any more, or in any case, non-operative."
Therefore, there should not be any violation of the indicated Constitu-
tional parameters.
Article 27, fourth paragraph, of the Constitution, cannot be read out of
context, but must be coordinated with Article 26 - pertinent in its speci-
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ficity - and with both Articles 10 and 11, that extend Constitutional pro-
tection to the generally recognized principles of international law, among
these the old, and well established principle pacta sunt servanda (obliga-
tions must be kept). The prohibition of the death penalty cannot deny
this fundamental form of international judicial collaboration, that is put
into effect through extradition. Of significance is Article 26 of the Con-
stitution, that allows the extradition of an Italian citizen "when it is spe-
cifically provided for by International Conventions," but excluding it for
political crimes.
Rendering absolute the prohibition for crimes punishable with the
death penalty would configure a right of asylum, or, at least, an unjustifi-
able right to be subjected to the Italian criminal jurisdiction for the most
serious crimes (Article 9 of the Criminal Code), and this would be in
open violation, according to the State Attorney, of the principle of terri-
torial jurisdiction of the criminal law.
4. Notified both by the a quo judge and by the appealing party, the
United States Government - assuming itself to be the interested party for
the legitimacy of the extradition act - joined in the action, arguing for the
lack of justification of the question of ratification and execution of the
Extradition Treaty.
4.1. In the substance, the arguments developed by the defense of the
President of the Cabinet of Ministers regarding the point of the binding
commitment of the requesting Government must be recalled; also it is
stressed that - pursuant to Article I, Section X, of the United States Con-
stitution - the Federated States cannot sign international treaties, be-
cause these are within the exclusive competence of the Federal Author-
ity, and they are bound to observe the provisions of same as clarified by
the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court. Therefore, the guaran-
tees provided by the United States Government with the verbal notes of
July 28, 1994, August 24, 1995, and January 12, 1996 are to be considered
binding for the State of Florida and for its Judges. In the case of a viola-
tion, the United States Government would place into effect the necessary
remedies directed to cause the Federal Court to intervene.
5. Also the private party (defendant) joined in the action, asking for
the declaration of Constitutional illegitimacy of the denounced Laws.
The person subject to extradition points out that the treaty between Italy
and the United States does not give sufficient protection to the defen-
dant charged with a crime punishable in the territory of the United States
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with the death penalty: while better protection is given, for example, by
the treaty between Italy and Morocco, which provides for the substitu-
tion of the death penalty with the penalty established by the Italian laws
for the same crime. Therefore, there would not be a reasonable assur-
ance about the non-imposition or non-execution of the death penalty,
since Article VI of the United States Constitution refers to the treaties
between the States of the Union, and not with international Countries,
among which the extradition treaty is included.
PART II: AFTER CONSIDERING THE LAW
1. The question of the Constitutional legitimacy of Article 698, para-
graph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and of Law May 26, 1984,
No. 225 (Ratification, and Execution of Extradition Treaty between the
Republic of Italy, and the United States of America, signed in Rome on
October 13, 1983), with regard to that portion which concerns the execu-
tion of Article IX of said Treaty, which provides for the extradition for
crimes, also those punishable with capital punishment, against the com-
mitment taken by the requesting Country - with guarantees considered
sufficient by the requested Country - not to punish with the death pen-
alty, or if this has already been imposed, not to execute it, has come un-
der examination by this Court.
2. The participation of the Government of the United States of
America is admissible, since it is a party legitimized to oppose in the pro-
ceedings a quo, as is the case in Venezia's appeal - which had been noti-
fied to the United States Embassy in Italy - and in the decisions for sus-
pension taken by the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio, legally
notified. The substantial right to a legitimate interest corresponds to the
formal profile, related to both the substance of the object of the question,
and to the constitutionality objection to laws that are the basis of the re-
quest and of the granting of extradition, one of which is the law estab-
lishing the execution of the extradition treaty in which the United States
Government is one of the contracting parties.
3. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the admissibility of the ques-
tion raised within a case pending before the Regional Administrative
Court for Lazio, regarding the legitimacy of the decree granting the ex-
tradition of Pietro Venezia by the Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia, at the
request of the Government of the United States of America. The State
Attorney observes on this point that this case concerns the legitimate in-
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terest of the person to be extradited in the correct application of the po-
litical-administrative power of the Ministry, and not the right to life,
which has already been taken under consideration by the non-
administrative judges who have exclusive jurisdiction in both grades
(Court of Appeal, and - for the appeal on substance - Supreme Court).
The denounced laws would not be relevant, because they are related to
the ordinary jurisdiction, for which the Ministerial Decree is an insur-
mountable obstacle.
3.1. The objection must be rejected.
Article 697 of the Code of Criminal Procedure orders that the delivery
of a person to a foreign Country can take place only by force of extradi-
tion; and Article 698, paragraph 2, provides for court, and procedural
guarantees for acts punishable with the death penalty by the Law of the
foreign Country, conditioning the granting of the extradition decree to
the decision of the ordinary jurisdiction in relation to the guarantees fur-
nished by the requesting Country, and their consequent evaluation by
the Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia.
The decree contested before the Administrative Judge, which refer-
ences the right to life of the person to be extradited, has also considered
the guarantees furnished by the foreign Country. Therefore the doubt
regarding the constitutionality of Article 698, paragraph 2 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is relevant because it ascribes a power to the Minis-
try that, in this case, was in fact used; also relevant is the doubt regarding
the law on execution of the Treaty, No. 225 of 1984, since this law grants
power to the two Authorities (judicial, and administrative), indicated in
the aforementioned Article 698.
It cannot be argued that the a quo judge had invoked subjective rights,
not included in his knowledge: The verification of the legitimacy of the
appealed decree - verification exercised in light of the observance of the
laws regulating the actions of the Ministry - must be exercised also with
regard to constitutional legality, this being the first due verification that
every Judge must exercise. This verification of legality, however, cannot
be construed as being limited to the principles of the administrative ac-
tion in a narrow sense if it insists on rights, or on interests protected (to
the highest degree) by the Constitution. The question can be admitted
on these grounds.
4. The substance of the question is justified.
The prohibition of the death penalty has a particular relevance - as the
prohibition of penalties. contrary to the sense of humanity would be - in
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the first part of the Constitution. Introduced by the fourth paragraph of
Article 27, it implies a principle "that in many senses can be considered
Italian" - these words are taken from the Report of the Committee to the
Constitutional Assembly, in the section devoted to civil rights - principle
that, "confirmed in the phases, and in the system of freedoms of our
Country, had been removed during the reactionary, and violent times," is
represented in the Constitutional System, as a projection of the guaran-
tee granted to the fundamental right to life, which is the first of the in-
violable Rights of Man, recognized by Article 2.
The absoluteness of this Constitutional guarantee has an influence on
the exercise of the powers granted to all public entities of our republican
system, and in this case on those powers through which international co-
operation is realized for the purpose of reciprocal judicial assistance.
Therefore, Article 27, fourth paragraph, read in light of Article 2 of the
Constitution, is to be considered an absolute parameter of evaluation of
the Constitutional legitimacy of the general law on granting extradition
(Article 698, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure), and of the
laws that provide for the execution of international treaties on extradi-
tion, and judicial assistance.
5. This Court has already reaffirmed that the participation of the Ital-
ian Government in the execution of penalties "that in no case, and for no
type of crime, could be inflicted in Italy in times of peace" is by itself in
violation of the Constitution (Sentence No. 54 of 1979). The point now
under examination is if the "guarantees" or "insurance" provided for by
the aforementioned Article 698, paragraph 2, and by Law May 26, 1984,
No. 225 of ratification, and execution of the Extradition Treaty between
the Government of the Republic of Italy, and the Government of the
United States of America, signed in Rome on October 13, 1983; and in
particular if this law is in conformance with the Constitution, with regard
to the part which provides for execution of Article IX of such Treaty,
where the law provides for the refusal of the extradition in the case of
crime being punishable with the death penalty in accordance with the
laws of the requesting party. The exception is in cases wheresuch party
"commits itself with guarantees, considered sufficient by the requested
party, not to inflict the death penalty, or if such penalty is inflicted, not to
have it executed".
As already mentioned, the procedure established by Article 698, para-
graph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is based on a double control
made, cases by case, by the Judicial Authority, and by the Ministero di
Grazia e Giustizia about the "sufficiency" of such guarantees. Therefore,
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the extradition is granted (or denied) after evaluations made by the Ital-
ian authorities on the individual requests with verifications within the
limits indicated above. This solution offers, in abstract, the advantage for
the requested Country of following a flexible policy, and allows for adap-
tations, over a period of time, based on considerations of criminal policy;
but in our juridical system, in which the prohibition of the death penalty
is constitutionally protected, the expression "sufficient guarantees" di-
rected to the granting of extradition for crimes punishable with capital
punishment pursuant to the law of the foreign Country - is not constitu-
tionally admissible. Because the prohibition pursuant to Article 27,
fourth paragraph of the Constitution, and the rights based on it - first of
all the essential right to life - impose an absolute guarantee.
The doubts of the private party with regard to the existence of judicial
remedies in the United States Law system protecting the obligations con-
tained in international treaties signed by the Federal Government are
without justification, and there is no question about the interpretation of
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution. The relevant point here is not the
point regarding the remedies provided for by the foreign laws, but the
intrinsic insufficiency of the mechanism provided for by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, and by the law concerning execution of the treaty
under examination, against the constitutional rule: The absolute nature
of the constitutional rule is invalidated by the presence of a law that
leaves to discretional evaluations, case by case, the judgment of the de-
gree of dependability of guarantees given by the requesting Country.
6. Therefore, the declaration of the illegitimacy of Article 628, para-
graph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and of Law No. 225 of 1984,
with regard to that portion that provides for execution of Article IX of
the Extradition Treaty between the Italian Government and the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America is to be demanded, because
they are in conflict with Articles 2 and 27, fourth paragraph of the Con-
stitution. Obviously, the remedy provided for Article 9, third paragraph,
of the Criminal Code remains applicable, with respect to the alternative
obligations of our Country (to deliver or to punish): At the request of the
Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia, the defendants convicted of crimes per-
petrated in a foreign Country are punishable according to the Italian
laws, with the penalty of at least three years of imprisonment, when ex-
tradition was not or could not be granted (Sentence No. 54 of 1979, no 7
of Considerato in Diritto).
The objections raised with reference to Articles 3 and 11 of the Consti-
tution are included in this decision.
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Appendix: In re Venezia
PART III: JUDGMENT
FOR THESE REASONS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
a) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 698, paragraph 2, of
the Code of Criminal Procedure;
b) declares the constitutional illegitimacy of Law May 26, 1984, No. 225
(Ratification and Execution of the Extradition Treaty between the Repub-
lic of Italy, and the United States of America, signed in Rome on October
13, 1983), with regard to that portion which provides for the execution of
Article IX of aforementioned Treaty.
This was decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, in
the Palazzo della Consulta, on June 25, 1996.
Signed: Mauro FERRI, Presiding Judge
Francesco GUIZZI, Relating Judge
Maria Rosaria FRUSCELLA, Clerk
Filed in the Office of the Clerk on June 27, 1996
The Clerk
Signed: FRUSCELLA
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